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ABSTRACT

ANALYSIS AND VERIFICATION OF ARITHMETIC
CIRCUITS USING COMPUTER ALGEBRA APPROACH
FEBRUARY 2020
TIANKAI SU
B.Sc., NORTHEAST DIANLI UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Maciej Ciesielski

Despite a considerable progress in verification of random and control logic, advances in formal verification of arithmetic designs have been lagging. This can be
attributed mostly to the difficulty of efficient modeling of arithmetic circuits and
data paths without resorting to computationally expensive Boolean methods, such
as Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) and Boolean Satisfiability (SAT) that require
“bit blasting”, i.e., flattening the design to a bit-level netlist. Similarly, approaches
that rely on computer algebra and Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) methods are
either too abstract to handle the bit-level complexity of arithmetic designs or require
solving computationally expensive decision or satisfiability problems. On the other
hand, theorem provers, popular solvers used in industry, require a significant human
interaction and intimate knowledge of the design to guide the proof process.
The work proposed in this thesis aims at overcoming the limitations of verifying
arithmetic circuits, especially at the post-synthesis, implementation phase. It adiv

dresses the verification problem at an algebraic level, treating an arithmetic circuit
and its specification as an algebraic system. Specifically, verification approach employed in this work is based on the algebraic rewriting method of [86]. In this method,
the circuit is modeled in the algebraic domain, where both the circuit specification
and its gate-level implementation are represented as polynomials. This work formally
analyzes the algebraic approach and compares it with the established computer algebra methods based on Gröbner basis reduction. It shows that algebraic rewriting
is more effective than the Gröbner basis reduction from the computational point of
view.
This thesis addresses two classes of arithmetic circuits that could not directly benefit from this type of functional verification, since performing algebraic rewriting of
such circuits encounters a serious memory issue. The circuits that fall in the first category are approximate arithmetic circuits, such as truncated integer multipliers. Different truncation schemes are considered, including bit deletion, bit truncation, and
rounding. The proposed verification method is based on reconstructing the truncated
multiplier to a complete, exact multiplier; it is then followed by algebraic rewriting to
prove that it indeed implements multiplication over the required range of bits. The
reconstruction of the multiplier helps avoid the memory overload issue as it creates a
”clean” multiplier with a well defined specification polynomial.
The other class of circuits that suffer from memory overload during algebraic
rewriting are circuits subjected to some arithmetic constraints. An example of such
circuits is a divider, where the divisor value cannot be zero. The other example can
be found in the basic blocks of the constant divider, where the value of carry into each
block must be less than the divisor value. In general, such constraints will be modeled
using the concept of vanishing monomials. A case-splitting method is proposed along
with the modified algebraic rewriting to resolve the memory issue. The proposed
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verification method not only can prove that the circuit performs a correct function
under the desired (valid) conditions, but also will test all the undesired (invalid) cases.
This work also addresses logic debugging of combinational arithmetic circuits over
field F2k , including Galois field multipliers. Galois Field (GF) arithmetic has numerous applications in digital communication, cryptography and security engineering,
and formal verification of such circuits is of prime importance. In addition to functional verification of GF multipliers, this work proposes a novel and effective method
for identifying and correcting bugs in such circuits, commonly referred to as debugging. In this work we propose a novel approach to debugging of GF arithmetic circuits
based on forward rewriting, which enables functional verification and debugging at
the same time. This technique can handle multiple bugs, does not suffer from the
polynomial size explosion encountered by other methods, and allows one to identify
and automatically correct bugs in GF circuits.
The techniques and algorithms proposed in this dissertation have been implemented in several computer programs, some stand-alone, and some integrated with
a popular synthesis and verification tool, ABC [11]. The experimental results for
verification and debugging are compared with the state-of-the-art SAT, SMT, and
other computer algebraic solvers.
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Gröbner basis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

3. FORMAL VERIFICATION OF INTEGER ARITHMETIC
CIRCUITS USING COMPUTER ALGEBRA
APPROACH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
vii

3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6

Algebraic Model of Electronic Circuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

With the ever-increasing size and complexity of integrated circuits (IC) and systems on chip (SoC), hardware verification has become a dominating factor of the
overall design flow [32]. Particularly important and challenging is the verification of
datapaths and their arithmetic components. Importance of arithmetic verification
problem grows with an increased use of arithmetic modules in embedded systems to
perform computation-intensive tasks for multi-media, signal processing, and cryptography applications.
Current formal verification techniques are ineffective when dealing with large
arithmetic designs as they rely on the established Boolean techniques that require
flattening the entire design into a bit-level netlist, informally referred to as ”bitblasting”. In this work, we address this issue by solving the verification problem in
algebraic domain instead of in strictly Boolean. The proposed technique is discussed
in Chapter 3, is efficient and scalable to verify large standard arithmetic circuits,
such as adders and multipliers. In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, we further extend the
technique to make it be able to handle some non-standard classes of arithmetic circuits. The issue of verification and logic debugging of Galois Field circuits has been
addressed in Chapter 6 by a rewriting-based method.
In this chapter, we first review the hardware design flow and illustrate the importance of hardware verification in the flow. Then, traditional Boolean verification
methods are briefly reviewed, along with their limitations. Those methods are not
sufficiently effective to verify the large and complex circuits, especially modern arith-
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metic circuits [10][16][24][58]. This provides the motivation of this thesis, which aims
at overcoming the limitations of verifying large arithmetic circuits.

1.1

Hardware Design and Verification Flow

On May 26th, 1960, the first planar integrated circuit was produced [84]. This
event opened the door for Integrated Circuits (ICs) industry, and soon was followed
by the Electronic Design Automation (EDA) [1][30]. During the next several decades,
a large number of Computer Aided Design (CAD) tools have been developed to support design automation that would replace the handcrafted IC design process [54][33].
CAD software is widely used to increase the productivity of the semiconductor industry. Today, IC design and manufacturing gained maturity, owing to the Very
large-scale integration (VLSI) design flow automation [49][80]. Current EDA and
IC technology support designs with millions of logic gates and billions of individual
transistors. A general IC design flow [44] and its basic steps are shown in Fig.1.1.

Figure 1.1: Typical industrial IC design flow.

The starting process for the design is a system-level specification. It is usually
written in a software programming language (C, C++, etc.) or a behavioral Hardware
Description Language (such as Verilog, System Verilog, VHDL) [23], which describes
the behavior and functionality of the design. The specification is then compiled into
a register-transfer-level (RTL) description and translated into Boolean expressions
2

of individual logic blocks and the interconnection logic [77]. After that, the generated logic expressions are synthesized and mapped onto gate-level netlists. Different
optimization goals are used during logic synthesis, such as area, delay or power minimization, depending on the intended application and the target technology, ASIC [71]
or FPGA [17][7]. Then, the layout design tools, commonly known as Place and Route
[67][64], are used to perform physical design. Before the circuit is fabricated and
taped out, it must be subjected to a thorough verification to guarantee its functional
correctness.
Hardware verification is crucial and must be conducted during each step of the
design process. Specifically, the goal of the verification is to check if the actual
hardware implementation meets the required specification, that is, to ensure that no
errors were introduced during any of the synthesis steps, either by the designer or by
the CAD tools. In practice, it is common for designers to make manual, last-minute
changes to a netlist, commonly known as Engineering Change Orders (ECOs) [2],
and those can potentially introduce errors. As soon as one step of the design contains
a bug, it has to be identified and corrected [48]. For this reason, the design has to be
thoroughly verified at each step.
There are several types of verification, such as Equivalence Checking (EC) [61],
Model Checking [79], Property checking [39], and Functional Verification [38]. Typically, equivalence checking is applied between different levels of abstraction of the
design to check their equivalence before and after each optimization or transformation
in the design flow. While simulation is one of the better understood and developed
traditional approaches to verify a circuit, exhaustive simulation is not applicable to
large modern designs, whose size continues to grow exponentially [89]. For this reason, several formal techniques have been developed to handle large practical circuits,
including canonical decision diagrams (BDDs, BMDs, TEDs), Boolean Satisfiability
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(SAT), Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) and Theorem Proving. These techniques are briefly described in the next section.
This thesis focuses on functional verification of a particular class of designs, namely
arithmetic circuits, which are harder to verify than logic circuits. In particular, we target gate-level implementation of combinational arithmetic circuits. The other kinds
of hardware verification, such as model and property checking, physical verification,
timing verification, clock domain crossing (CDC) verification, and other timing related verification are not the subject of this work.

1.2
1.2.1

Traditional Boolean Verification Methods
Binary Decision Diagram (BDD)

Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) [14] and their variants, such as BMDs [13],
TEDs [19] and FDDs [8], belong to the class of Canonical Diagrams. Of particular
importance is BDD, an efficient data structure to represent and manipulate Boolean
functions. BDDs are minimal, canonical and irreducible representation derived from
Shannon expansion [37].
BDD is a rooted, directed, acyclic graph, whose nodes represent binary decisions.
Each node represents a binary variable v and has two children: one (positive cofactor)
representing the function with variable taking value v = 1, the other one (positive
cofactor) with v = 0. There are also two terminal nodes, constant 1 and constant 0.
The Boolean function encoded in a BDD is obtained by enumerating all the paths
from the root to constant node 1. An example of a BDD is shown in Fig. 1.2(c) for
Boolean function f (x1 , x2 , x3 ) = x¯1 x¯2 x¯3 + x1 x2 + x2 x3 . For comparison, its function
is also shown as a truth table Fig. 1.2(b).
The BDDs are typically ordered such that along any path from root to constant
node 1, the variables appear in the same order. By construction, a BDD is minimal
and irreducible, in the sense that there are no two nodes that correspond to the
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a ) Decision Tree

b ) Truth Table c ) Binary Decision Diagram

Figure 1.2: Different representations of Boolean Function

same function. Such BDDs are called Reduced Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams
(ROBDDs) [70], referred to as BDDs for short. An important feature of the BDD is
that it is canonical. This feature makes it possible to check equivalence between two
functions. This is done by constructing their BDDs for the same order of variables
and checking if they are isomorphic.
The example of equivalence checking using BDD is shown in Figure1.3. The
Boolean function has been mapped into two different logic designs z and z 0 as shown
in Figure1.3 (a) and Figure1.3 (b). Since BDD is canonical for a given variable order,
EC can be done by comparing the BDDs of these two designs with the same variable
ordering. In this example, the variable is orders in a → b → c. Since their BDDs are
identical (see Figure 1.3 (c)), these two designs are functionally equivalent.
However, the BDD-based equivalence checking has its limitations since the size
of the BDD grows dramatically for large designs, making it impractical for the verification of arithmetic circuits, especially the multipliers. For example, the BDD of
a 4-bit integer multiplication has 1, 022 nodes, and for a 6-bit multiplication, the
number of BDD nodes goes up to 8, 176. In general, for complex arithmetic circuits,
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a ) design 1

b ) design 2

c ) ROBDD of both designs

Figure 1.3: Equivalence checking using BDD.

the construction and composition of BDDs is computationally expensive, and the
exponentially increasing number of BDD nodes can cause memory problem [22][46].

1.2.2

Boolean satisfiability problem (SAT)

To mitigate the limitations of BDDs, other techniques have been developed to
reduce the complexity of equivalence checking and other verification tusks. One of
them that made a significant impact on the verification field is Boolean Satisfiability
(SAT). The goal of SAT is to find an assignment of variables for which a given Boolean
formula evaluates to 1. Typically the formula is given in a conjunctive normal form
(CNF) [81], a conjunction of one or more clauses, where a clause is a disjunction of
literals. For example, Boolean formula ϕ = (a + ¬b)(¬a + ¬b + c) can be satisfied by
choosing { a = 1; b = 0; c = 0 }, which makes ϕ = 1. If the assignment of variables
that makes the Boolean formula ϕ = 1 does not exist, the problem is called unsatisfied
(unSAT).
Several SAT solvers have been developed to solve Boolean decision problems,
such as GRASP [47], Chaff [52], Lingeling [6] and MiniSAT [72]. All SAT solvers
are based on the basic Davis-Putnam- Logemann-Loveland (DPLL) [26] algorithm, a
backtracking-based search algorithm, introduced originally by Davis and Putnam in
6

1969 [83]. Many newer techniques, such as non-chronological backtracking, resolution, recursive learning, etc., have been developed to improve the efficiency of SAT
solver. Modern SAT solvers come in two flavors: ”conflict-driven” and ”look-ahead”.
Conflict-driven solvers, such as MiniSAT [72], augment the basic DPLL search algorithm with efficient conflict analysis. The Conflict-Driven Clause Learning (CDCL)
provides ability to learn new clauses that prevents the space search from ending in an
unsatisfying assignment. Look-ahead solvers, such as march dl [18], have strengthened reductions and improved the heuristics.
SAT methods are widely used in formal verification. In particular, they are used to
check equivalence between two circuits by creating a so-called miter and proving that
its output is unSAT. An example of a miter configuration is shown in Fig. 1.4, where
two circuits F, G are connected by a cluster of XORs and an OR gate. Typically, one
circuit is considered to be the reference (golden) circuit, known to be correct, and the
other one is the implementation that one wants to verify.

Figure 1.4: Using miter to solve equivalent checking in SAT

If the two circuits are functionally equivalent, then, for any input assignment, the
same values should be observed at their outputs. In this case, none of the XORs would
produce output 1, and the output of the OR gate should be 0. On the other hand, if
different output values are computed by the two circuits for some input assignment,
the output of the OR gate will be 1. Using this argument, the equivalence checking
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problem can be solved by checking if the output of the miter is unSAT (i.e., it never
evaluates to 1). The expression of the miter’s output is constructed from the circuits
components in their CNF form. If the output of the miter is unSAT for all possible
input assignment, the two circuits are equivalent. Otherwise, the problem is satisfiable
and the SAT solver returns a counterexample, an assignment of inputs for which the
two circuits produce different outputs.
The SAT-based method is particularly efficient at finding a satisfying solution.
However, most of the circuit verification problems rely on checking if the problem
is unSAT, as discussed above. Theoretically, in order to prove that the assignment
of variables that evaluates a given Boolean formula to 1 does not exist, one has to
evaluate all possible input assignment. Although there are many advanced algorithms
that help refine the search space, the SAT method has a low scalability for large
arithmetic circuits. For example, the state-of-the-art SAT solver, miniSAT blbd [18],
takes up to an hour to verify a 16-bit multiplier [74], and is ineffective in handling
32-bit and 64-bit wide multiplication in core datapaths.

1.2.3

Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT)

An extension of Boolean SAT is Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) [59], which
builds on SAT by incorporating different supporting theories. It is intended to solve
more complex problem. Instead of treating the problem in a strictly Boolean domain,
the SMT solvers integrate different well-defined theories (Boolean logic, bit vectors,
integer and real arithmetic, linear inequalities, uninterpreted functions, arrays, lists,
etc.) into a DPLL-style SAT decision procedure. By doing so, SMT solvers can solve a
satisfiability problem of a word-level miter. For example, to check if the circuit shown
in Figure 1.5(a) implements a Half-adder (HA), a word-level miter z = a + b − (2c + s)
is generated. The CNF formula of the miter is shown in 1.5(b). The last equation
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models the miter as bit-vector adding (a + b) and −(2c + s), where the constant ”10”
represents bit-vector of the integer constant 2.

a ) Half adder with input a,
input b, output s as the sum
and output c as the carry.

b ) CNF formula of word-level miter.

Figure 1.5: Using SMT method to solve world-level miter.

Some of the modern commonly known SMT solvers include Boolector [55], Z3 [28]
and CVC [73]. However, SMT solvers still model the problem as a decision problem,
and are not efficient at verifying large arithmetic circuits as demonstrated in the
literature and confirmed in our experiments.

1.2.4

Theorem Proving

Another class of verification solvers, particularly popular in industry, are Theorem
Provers, which based on a deductive proof system. The proof system is usually
based on a strongly problem-specific database of axioms and inference rules, such as
simplification, rewriting, and induction. The most common theorem proving systems
are: HOL [36], PVS [56], Boyer-Moore/ACL2 [12], and Nqthm [41]. These systems
are characterized by high abstraction and powerful logic expressiveness. The use of
a general mathematical framework offers some advantages that can be significant, or
even essential, for some verification tasks.
However these systems are highly interactive, requiring user guidance and deep
understanding of the design and the system. In order to prove that an implementation
satisfies the specification, one has to describe their relation as theorems within the
9

context of a proof calculus. Building such a system from the scratch is difficult,
since modeling of the gate-level circuits in theorem proving is extremely complex.
Typically, using such systems is more difficult and time-consuming than using highly
automated, methods like SAT or model checking [85][45]. Furthermore, the success of
verification using theorem proving depends on the set of available axioms and rewrite
rules, and on the choice their order, so it cannot always guarantee a conclusive answer
[78][40]. With so many limitations, Theorem Proving is not a good choice for a general
circuit verification. In the next two chapters, a more effective method is proposed
based on computer algebra, which forms the foundation of this thesis.

1.3

Motivation

Traditional Boolean verification methods discussed in the previous section are
unsuitable for verifying large arithmetic circuits. As mentioned earlier, the need for
”bit blasting”, i.e., flattening the design into bit-level netlist, makes their computation
very expensive when the width of the data path is large. To address this issue, the
method proposed in this work models the verification problem in an algebraic domain,
rather than strictly Boolean. An efficient approach, called algebraic rewriting, based
on Symbolic Computer Algebra is introduced in Chapter 3. While the basic rewriting
approach has been proposed in our earlier work [86][21][22], in this thesis it is further
refined and formalized.
Algebraic rewriting provides impressive results in verifying standard arithmetic
circuit [86], such as adders and multipliers. However, when dealing with arithmetic
circuits derived from the standard class, it becomes prohibitive (in terms of memory
usage) as shown in the later experiments. Two classes for non-standard arithmetic
circuits are discussed in this thesis: 1) truncated circuits, in which some of the output
bits are truncated; 2) arithmetic circuits are subjected to some Boolean or arithmetic
constraints. Little attention to the verification of such circuits has been given in the
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literature so far. In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, these problems are formally analyzed
and efficient solutions are proposed.
The proposed computer algebra-based verification method can be applied not
only to check if the circuit is functionally correct, but also to identify and correct the
logic bugs. Bug identification and correction (debugging) are known hard problems.
In general, logic debugging methods are heuristic, and their performance, and even
success, strongly depends on the location of the bug in the circuit. In Chapter 6,
we propose a debugging technique for which this problem can be solved efficiently
on a class of arithmetic circuits, namely Galois Field multipliers. To the best of our
knowledge, it is the first debugging method whose performance is not significantly
affected by the bug location.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND

This chapter provides mathematical background of computer algebra method used
in this thesis and reviews the related work in the literature. Specifically, in order to
build an algebraic model for an arithmetic circuit in the context of computer algebra,
the following concepts are needed: fields, polynomials, ideals, varieties and ideal
membership, and Gröbner basis.

2.1
2.1.1

Fields, Polynomials, Ideals and Varieties
Fields

In mathematics, a field is a set F , containing at least two elements, on which two
operations + and · (called addition and multiplication, respectively) are defined so
that for each pair of elements x, y in F there are unique elements x + y and x · y in
F . A field is thus a fundamental algebraic structure, which is widely used in algebra,
number theory, and many other areas of mathematics. To learn about fields, we start
with the commutative ring, since field is a special class of ring. A commutative ring
consists of a set R and two binary operations ”·” and ”+” defined on R, for which
the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) Associativity: (a + b) + c = a + (b + c) and (a · b) · c = a · (b · c) for all a, b, c, ∈ R.
(ii) Commutativity: a + b = b + a and a · b = b · a for all a, b ∈ R.
(iii) Distributivity: a · (b + c) = a · b + a · c for all a, b, c ∈ R.
(iv) Identities: There are 0, 1 ∈ R such that a + 0 = a and a · 1 = a for all a ∈ R.
(v) Additive inverses: Given a ∈ R, there is b ∈ R such that a + b = 0.
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Two examples of commutative rings are the integers Z and the polynomial ring
k[x1 ,...,xn ], with coefficients in an arbitrary field k. A field F is a commutative
ring with unity, where every element in F, except 0, has a multiplicative inverse:
∀a ∈ (F − {0}), ∃â ∈ F such that a · â = 1. The most commonly used fields are Q, R
and C. The set Z, which is of particular interest to us, is a ring but not a field, since
it does not have the attribution of multiplicative inverse.

2.1.2

Polynomials

A polynomial is an expression consisting of variables and coefficients, that involves
the operations of addition, multiplication, and non-negative integer exponents of variables. In general, a polynomial f in variables x1 ,...,xn is a finite linear combination
of monomials, with coefficients in some field k. A polynomial can always be written
P
in a sum-of-product form f =
ai xαi i , where each product xαi i is called monomial
and ai is the coefficient. A monomial in variables x1 ,...,xn is a product of the form
xα1 1 · xα2 2 · · · xαnn , where all of the exponents α1 ,...,αn are nonnegative integers. The
degree of this monomial is the sum α1 + · · · + αn . The total degree of polynomial
f , denoted deg(f ), is the maximum degree among all the monomials. A term of f is
the product of a nonzero coefficient and its monomial. As an example, polynomial
f = 2x3 y 2 z + 23 y 3 z 3 − 3xyz + y 2 has four terms and total degree six. Note that there
are two terms of maximal total degree, which is something that cannot happen for
polynomials in one variable.
There are several ways to order monomials (referred to as term order), such as
lexicographic order (LEX), Degree reverse lexicographic order (DEGREVLEX), and
others. For instance, in LEX order, 2x3 y 2 z > 32 y 3 z 3 . The first, or greatest term of f
(in terms of the adapted term order), is called the leading term lt(f ) of the polynomial
f . In the above example, the leading term is 2x3 y 2 z.
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Leading terms play an important role in the proposed verification method, where
logic gates of a circuit are described as polynomials. Specifically, the polynomial
terms are ordered such that the leading term represents a variable representing an
output of a gate. This ordering makes a profound impact on the efficiency of the
proposed verification technique. This issue will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
In this work, since all variables representing in the circuits are Boolean, we are
particularly interested in polynomials with variables of degree 1. Such a polynomial is
called Pseudo-Boolean polynomial. Formally, a Pseudo-Boolean function is a function
f : B n → R, where B = {0, 1} is a Boolean domain and n is a nonnegative integer
called the arity of the function. It can be written as a multi-linear polynomial

f =a+

X

ai x i +

X

aij xi xj +

i<j

X

aijk xi xj xk + . . .

i<j<k

with constant coefficients a, ai , ... in the given field.
2.1.3

Ideals and Varieties

Given a polynomial ring R = k[x1 ,...,xn ] with coefficients in some field k, a subset
I ⊂ R is an ideal if it satisfies:
(i) 0 ∈ I. (ii) If f, g ∈ I , then f + g ∈ I. (iii) If f ∈ I and h ∈ R, then hf ∈ I.
In general, if I ∈ k[x1 ,...,xn ] consists of all the linear combinations of a set of
polynomials {f1 , ..., fs } ∈ k[x1 ,...,xn ], then I is an ideal of the set {f1 , ..., fs }, and the
set of {fi } is called generator or basis.
J = hf1 , ..., fs i = h1 f1 + ... + hs fs : hi ∈ R

(2.1)

We call hf1 , ..., fs i the ideal generated by the basis {f1 , ..., fs }.
Given an ideal J = hf1 , ..., fs i generated by f1 , ..., fs , ∈ k[x1 , ..., xd ], the set of all
solutions to: f1 = f2 = · · · = fs = 0 is called variety V (f1 , ..., fs ) of J. While
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an ideal may have different bases, the variety depends only on the ideal and not on
the basis (generator). That is, different bases that produce the same ideal will have
exactly the same variety. In Section 2.3, we will introduce an especially useful basis
for our verification, called Gröbner basis.
Let {f1 , ..., fs } and {g1 , ..., gt } be the bases of the same ideal in k[x1 ,...,xn ], i.e.
hf1 , ..., fs i = hg1 , ..., gt i; then V (f1 , ..., fs ) = V (g1 , ..., gt ). In the next section, we will
show how the concept of ideal and variety is applied to circuit verification.

2.2

Ideal Membership Test

The symbolic algebra theories about polynomial rings, ideals and varieties we use
in this work are all defined over a field, typically Q. However, as described next and
fully developed in the next section, the polynomials introduced in our work represent
logic gates and are defined over ring Z. However, these polynomials have a special
structure, namely their leading term lt(fi ) that represents a variable associated with
a logic gate gi , has coefficient 1. Subsequently, the process of polynomial division,
which is an essential element of the verification process (to be described in detail
later), will never introduce any coefficient outside of Z. Consequently, this allows us
to treat the polynomials as if they were in Q.
Let B = {f1 , ...fs }, with fi ∈ Z[X], be a set of polynomials representing the
circuit elements and let the ideal J = hf1 , ..., fs i be generated by basis {f1 , ..., fs }. In
our case, each generator is a polynomial model of a circuit module (logic gate), and
the set of generators can be viewed as the implementation of the circuit. Then, from
the circuit perspective, the variety V (J) of J, which is the set of all simultaneous
solutions to a system of equations f1 (x1 , ..., xn ) = 0; ..., fs (x1 , ..., xn ) = 0, contains all
signal values of the circuit for all possible input valuations {xi }.
Similarly, functional specification of the circuit is also defined as a polynomial in
Z[X], where X is a set of inputs and outputs. For example, the specification of a
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multiplier circuit, Z = A · B, can then be written as a polynomial F : Z − A · B.
Here, A, B, and Z are symbolic, word-level variables, each represented as a polynomial
Pn−1 i
in their respective bit-level variables, e.g., A = i=0
2 ai , and similarly for B and
R. In terms of computer algebra, the arithmetic circuit verification problem is then
formulated as follows [59][46][68][66]:
Given a circuit represented by a set of generators (implementation), B = {f1 , ..., fs },
and the specification F , the goal of functional verification is to prove that the implementation (B) satisfies the specification (F ). Here, B have the same notation as the
previous example, but it represents the set of gate polynomials.
This means that for a functionally correct circuit, the solution to F = 0 agrees
with V (J), or, equivalently, that F vanishes on V (J)1 . Consequently, this problem
has been termed as an ideal membership test, which decides whether the specification
polynomial F is a member of the ideal J generated by B, i.e., if F ∈ J [35][59][46].
Given an ideal J = hf1 , ..., fs i, in order to test if F ∈ J, polynomial F is divided
consecutively by f1 , ..., fs . The goal of each division is to cancel the leading term of F
(with respect to a chosen term order) using one of the leading terms of f1 , ..., fs . Such
a reduction results in a polynomial remainder r = F −

lt(F )
lt(fi )

· fi , in which the leading

term lt(F ) has been canceled. If the remainder r reduces to zero, the implementation
satisfies the specification. However, if r 6= 0, such a conclusion cannot be drawn: r
can still be in J but it is not divisible by any of the polynomials in B = {f1 , ..., fs }.
That is, the basis B = {f1 , ..., fs } may not be sufficient to reduce F −→ 0, and yet
the circuit may be correct. To check if F is reducible to zero for the given ideal J,
one must compute a canonical set of generators, G = {p1 , ..., pt }, called the Gröbner
basis, with the same ideal hp1 , ..., pt i = hf1 , ..., fs i. Let the set G = {p1 , ..., pt } be the
Gröbner basis for ideal J, then F belongs to J if and only if the remainder of the
1

Polynomial f is said to vanish on a set V if ∀a ∈ V f (a) = 0. Or, V (f ) ⊆ V (J).
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G

division of F by the elements of G is zero, denoted as ∀F ∈ J, F −→+ 0 [3]. The sign
+ means that the division/reduction is done consecutively by using the elements of
G one by one. In short, the Gröbner basis is necessary to unequivocally answer the
question whether F ∈ J.

2.3

Gröbner basis

A basis {p1 , ..., pt } of an ideal Jhp1 , ..., pt i is called a Gröbner basis (w.r.t. the
monomial order >) if the leading term of every nonzero element of J is a multiple
of (at least) one of the leading term lt(p1 ), ..., lt(pt ). A known algorithmic procedure for computing a Gröbner basis is called Buchberger’s algorithm [15]. Given
some basis B = {f1 , ..., fs }, it produces another basis G = {p1 , ..., pt }, such that the
ideals hp1 , ..., pt i = hf1 , ..., ft i and hence have the same variety V (hGi) = V (hBi).
Buchberger’s algorithm is computationally expensive, since it computes the so-called
S-polynomials (SPoly) by performing reduction operations on all pairs of polynomials in B. The S-polynomial of polynomials p and g in a polynomial set P , is
the combination Spoly(p, g) =

L
p
lt(p)

−

L
g,
lt(g)

where L is the least common multiple

LCM(lm(p), lm(g)). Note that Spoly(p, g) cancels the leading terms of p and g, and
P

the remainder r obtained in Spoly(p, g) F −→+ r gives a new leading term.
The basic purpose of computing SPoly pairs is to compute polynomials with new
leading terms, which can be used in the reduction step of the ideal-membership testing. These newly generated polynomials belong to the ideal G which completely
defines the system. To compute Gröbner basis G = {g1 , ..., gl } for an ideal hp1 , ..., pt i,
Buchberger’s algorithm computes G in some finite number of steps by performing the
P

P

Spoly(p, g) −→+ r iteratively. The algorithm determines if Spoly(p, g) −→+ 0. In
this case, we also conclude that all polynomials are relatively prime to each other,
with a distinct leading term.
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This establishes that the generating set (generator) whose polynomials are relatively prime to each other is in fact a Gröbner basis. This important fact will be
used in developing the verification method in the upcoming sections. A number of
other algorithms have been developed for computing a Gröbner basis, such as F 4 [34],
which in contrast to the basic Buchberger’s algorithm, compute multiple SPoly pairs
in each iteration. However, in general, the process of generating a Gröbner remains
computationally expensive.

2.4

Related Work

The work in arithmetic circuit verification was pioneered by Shekhar et al. [69]
and Wienand et al. [82], where some important concepts from computer algebra and
algebraic geometry were applied to model the core verification problem. In [82] an
arithmetic circuit is modeled as a network of arithmetic operators, such as half- and
full-adders, comparators, and product generators, extracted from the gate-level implementation. These operators are modeled using arithmetic bit-level (ABL) expressions,
B = {Bj }. The authors of [82] (and also of [46]) show that for an arbitrary combinational circuit, if the terms of the gate equations B are ordered in reverse topological
order, {outputs} > {inputs}, then all leading monomials of the polynomials in B are
relatively prime. As a result, the corresponding set B already constitutes a Gröbner
basis (GB), obviating the computation of the complete canonical Gröbner basis. The
verification problem is solved by reducing the specification F modulo B to a normal
form and testing if it vanishes over Z2n . The restriction to binary variables is achieved
by imposing Boolean constraints, hx2 − xi for all the variable x [59], and the problem
is solved over quotient ring Q = Z2n [X]/hx2 − xi (for all variable x) using a popular
computer algebra system, Singular [29]. This approach, however, is limited to circuits
composed entirely of half adders and full adders, which must first be extracted from
the gate-level implementation. In practice, this is the most expensive part of the
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process, and it is not always possible to perform such extraction, especially in highly
bit-optimized implementations.
In [46] the verification problem was similarly formulated as an ideal membership
test but applied to Galois Field (GF or F2q ) arithmetic circuits. It has been shown
that in GF, when the specification F and the ideal J of the circuit implementation
are in F2q , the problem can be reduced to testing if F ∈ (J + J0 ), over a larger ideal
(J + J0 ) where J0 = hx2 − xi is an ideal of the field polynomials. Adding J0 basically
restricts the variety V to solutions in F2 , i.e. to V (J) ∩ V (J0 ) [25]. The polynomials
of J0 are referred to as field polynomials. Similarly to [82], the authors of [46] derive
the term order from the topological structure of the circuit, which renders the set
of polynomials B (circuit implementation) a Gröbner basis (GB), thus obviating the
need to perform the expensive GB computation. The method uses a customized,
F4-style polynomial reduction using a modified Gaussian elimination algorithm [34]
under this term order.
A different approach has been proposed in [86], whereby the expensive polynomial reduction has been replaced by a computationally simpler algebraic rewriting
technique. The method introduces the concept of an input signature, a polynomial in
the primary inputs, and an output signature, a polynomial derived from the encoding
of the primary outputs. The verification is accomplished by rewriting the output
signature, using algebraic expressions of the internal gates, into an input signature.
This process de facto performs function extraction. Several ordering techniques have
been described to make this method applicable to large arithmetic circuits, but the
method still cannot handle the heavily optimized circuits.
A similar approach to arithmetic circuit verification, called backward construction,
was proposed in 1995 in [37]. It uses BMDs to reconstruct functional, high level
representation from the gate-level structure of arithmetic circuits such as adders and
multipliers. Experimental results show that time complexity of the tested circuits is
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in the order of n4 for multipliers with n bit operands. There is no clear indication if
the BMD is an efficient data structure for this problem.
The basic approach of the ideal membership testing and Gröbner basis (GB)
reduction has also been used in the works of [68][66], where it was applied to integer
circuits. In [68] the following features have been added to make the reduction more
efficient: 1) Logic reduction with an AND-XOR vanishing rule, which analyzes the
structure of the circuit to identify and remove vanishing monomials that correspond to
the product of XOR, AND signals with shared input variables; 2) An XOR rewriting
scheme, which reduces the model of the circuit to consider only primary inputs,
outputs, and fan-out points/XOR gates; and 3) Common rewriting, which eliminates
the nodes with a single parent. These techniques simplify the task of GB reduction by
eliminating all the nodes which have exactly one parent, thus increasing the chance
for early term cancellation during the rewriting process.
Another work [66] revisits the techniques from [86] and [68] and provides the proof
of correctness for these approaches. It uses a column-wise technique to model and
verify basic multiplier structures by computing the Gröbner basis incrementally for
each column of the output bit, rather than for the entire circuit. The paper justifies
the use of the theory of ideal membership (in principle applicable to Q[X]) to prove
properties of integer arithmetic circuits in Z. It points out that, since the leading
coefficients of the gate polynomials forming the Gröbner basis are +1 or -1, polynomial
reduction never introduces fractional coefficients and their computation remains in
Z. This also explains why the dedicated implementations in [86] and [68] can rely on
computation in Z only, while remaining sound and complete [66]. A follow-up paper
[65] describes an enhancement to this column-wise technique by extracting half- and
full-adder constraints to further reduce the size of Gröbner basis to speed up the
reduction process.
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In general, the problem of formally verifying complex integer arithmetic circuits
(not just multipliers) remains open, and new solutions are being proposed. In the
next chapter, an efficient and scalable approach, called algebraic rewriting, is formally
introduced to address this issue. This approach has already been proposed by our
group earlier, but it is further refined and formalized in this thesis. In addition, a bitflow model is proposed to support the proof of the correctness of algebraic rewriting,
and to offer a new insight into the problem of arithmetic circuit verification [20].
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CHAPTER 3
FORMAL VERIFICATION OF INTEGER ARITHMETIC
CIRCUITS USING COMPUTER ALGEBRA APPROACH

This chapter introduces an algebraic model used in circuit verification, which is
the key to solve the verification problem in algebraic domain. Two flavors of computer
algebra techniques that use this model will be discussed in detail: 1) Gröbner basis
reduction techniques [59][68][66] and 2) algebraic rewriting [86]. Detailed algorithms
for the reduction and the rewriting are given. We analyze the relation between these
two computer algebra techniques and provide a comparison from the efficiency point
of view.

3.1

Algebraic Model of Electronic Circuit

The arithmetic circuits considered in this thesis are circuits whose computation
can be expressed as a polynomial in the input variables. These include adders, subtractors, multipliers, fused add-multiply circuits, dividers, etc.. The circuit is modeled
as a network of interconnected bit-level components, each with a finite set of binary
inputs and one or more binary outputs. In this work we will focus on gate-level integer arithmetic circuits with single-output logic gates. However, the model can be
extended to other, more complex and multiple-output circuit components.
Each gate is modeled by a pseudo-Boolean polynomial fi ∈ Z[X], with Boolean
variables X representing circuit signals associated with the gate. It is an algebraic
expression with usual multiplication and addition operators over Boolean variables.
Formally, a pseudo-Boolean polynomial is an integer-valued function f : {0, 1}n → Z.
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The following expressions summarize the algebraic representation of basic Boolean
operators NOT, AND, OR and XOR.
¬a = 1 − a
a∧b=a·b
(3.1)
a∨b=a+b−a·b
a ⊕ b = a + b − 2a · b
By construction, each expression evaluates to a binary value {0,1} and hence correctly
models the Boolean function of a logic gate. Models for more complex AOI (And-OrInvert) gates, used in standard cell technology, are readily obtained from these basic
logic expressions. For example, the algebraic model for the logic gate g = a∨(b∧c) can
be derived as g = a + bc − abc, etc. Similarly, a 3-input OR gate can be represented as
z = a+b+c−ab−ac−bc+abc, a 3-input XOR gate as z = a+b+c−2ab−2ac−2bc+4abc,
etc.
Multiple output modules, such as single-bit adders, with binary inputs can be
expressed similarly. For example, a half-adder (HA) and a full-adder (FA), can be
expressed by the following expressions:
ha : 2C + S = a + b

(3.2)

fa : 2C + S = a + b + cin
where a, b, cin are binary inputs and C, S are binary outputs.
The function computed by an arithmetic circuit is represented as a specification
polynomial in the primary input variables, denoted Fspec . For example, the specification of an n-bit unsigned integer multiplier, Z = A · B with inputs A = [a0 , · · · , an−1 ]
P
Pn−1 i+j
and B = [b0 , · · · , bn−1 ], is described by Fspec = n−1
ai bj . The result of
i=0
j=0 2
the computation, stored in the primary output bits, is also expressed as a polynomial, called output signature, Sout . Typically, such a polynomial is linear, uniquely
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determined by the m-bit encoding of the output, provided by the designer. For example, for a signed 2’s complement arithmetic circuit with m output bits, Sout =
P
i
−2m−1 zm−1 + m−2
i=0 2 zi . The circuit is implemented as a network of logic gates G,
each modeled as a polynomial gi derived from Eqn.(6.1). The polynomial representing
a given gate evaluates to zero for all the input and output combinations satisfied by
this gate. As an example, a non-standard gate-level implementation of a full adder,
is shown in Fig. 3.1.

Figure 3.1: Gate-level arithmetic circuit (Full Adder)

The set of polynomials G = {fi } in Eqn. 3.3 represents the gate-level implementation of the full adder circuit. We refer to this set as G to indicate that it is a Gröbner
basis (or GB for short). It has been shown that if the polynomials in G are ordered
such that the leading term is the output of the gate, and the leading term of all the
polynomials are relatively prime, the set G forms Gröbner basis [62].
The set G consists of two parts: Gate polynomials (f1 , ..., f8 ) and Field polynomials
(f9 , ..., f17 ). Each gate polynomial satisfies the relation fi = 0. The gate polynomials
have the form fi = vi − tail(fi ), where the leading term lt(fi ) = vi is the output of
gate fi , and tail(fi ) is the logic specification of the gate in terms of its inputs. The
leading terms under such ordering are relatively prime, which renders G a Gröbner
basis [59][46][66]. This feature is essential for both the GB reduction and algebraic
rewriting, which will be discussed in the next sections.
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f1 = p1 − (−ab + a + b)
f2 = g1 − (−ab + 1)
f3 = S1 − p1 g1
f4 = C1 − (−g1 + 1)
f5 = p2 − (S1 c0 − S1 − c0 + 1)
f6 = g2 − S1 c0
(3.3)
f7 = S − (p2 g2 − p2 − g2 + +1)
f8 = C − (−C1 g2 + C1 + g2 )
f9 = (a2 − a)
f10 = (b2 − b)
······
f17 = (g22 − g2 )
Each field polynomials, f9 , ..., f17 , has the form J0 =< x2 − x >, where x is one of
the signals {a, b, c0 , p1 , g1 , S1 , C1 , p2 , g2 }. They play an important role in polynomial
reduction to maintain the Boolean property of each variable. However, they are
handled differently in the GB reduction than in the algebraic rewriting approach, as
discussed in the next sections.

3.2

Gröbner Basis Polynomial Reduction

In this method the reduction of F modulo G is accomplished by successively
eliminating terms of F , one by one, by a leading term of some polynomial fi ∈ G, using
Gaussian elimination. The reduction is performed over a Gröbner basis derived from
G and the field polynomials J0 . From the mathematical point of view, this means that
the computation will be performed in the quotient ring, Z[X]/hx2 −xi : x ∈ X, the set
of all variables (signals) of the circuit. The Gröbner basis (GB) reduction algorithm
is given in Algorithm 1. First, the polynomial base G={f1 , ..., fm } is derived from
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N using Equations (6.1), where m is the number of logic components in N . Each
polynomial in G has the form fi = v + tail(fi ), where v is the the leading monomial
lm(fi ). All the variables in the circuit are ordered in reverse-topological order, from
primary outputs to primary inputs, and for each gate polynomial from the gate output
to its inputs.
Furthermore, the output signals of the gates that depend on common variables
(fanins) should be ordered next to each other, as this will maximize the chance for a
potential term cancellation and minimize the size of intermediate polynomials. For
example, consider the reduction of a polynomial F = 2C + S + .... in a circuit
containing a half adder composed of an AND gate C = ab and an XOR gate S =
a + b − 2ab. Since both C and S depend on common variables, a, b, reducing them one
immediately after the other will eliminate the product term ab from the polynomial,
resulting in F = a + b + ...... This is beneficial from the complexity point of view, and
should be performed before the reduction of the remaining terms of the polynomial.
Considering these two basic ordering rules, one possible term order for the polynomial ring of the circuit in Figure 3.1 is shown below, where variables in curly brackets
can assume any relative order.

{S, C} > {p2 , g2 } > {S1 , C1 } > {p1 , g1 } > {a, b, c0 }

(3.4)

The expression F to be reduced is initialized with the difference between the output
signature Sout and Fspec . In this case F = 2C + S − (a + b + c0 ). The goal is to reduce
F to 0 by G.
The main part of the GB reduction is given in lines 5-15. The algorithm searches
for a polynomial fi in G such that the leading term of fi divides the current leading
term lt(F ) of F . If such a polynomial exists, it will be used to reduce F , as shown
in line 8. Otherwise, the lt(F ) will be moved to the remainder Rem (lines 11 − 12).
At any point, when new terms (containing new intermediate variables introduced by
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Algorithm 1 Gröebner Basis Polynomial Reduction
Input: Specification polynomial Fspec ;and Gate-level netlist N
Output: Remainder Rem
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:

Create base G={f1 ,...,fm } of N using Eq.(6.1)
Generate Sout from N
Define ring and specify term order
Initialize F ← Sout − Fspec
while F 6= 0 do
lt(F )
if ∃fi ∈ G : lt(f
6= 0 then
i)
/* there exists fi such that its leading term is divisible by lt(F ) */
lt(F )
F ← F − lt(f
· fi // polynomial division
i)
else
/* no leading term of fi divides F , move lt(F ) to Rem */
F ← F − lt(F )
Rem ← Rem + lt(F )
end if
Maintain the term order imposed on the ring
end while
return Rem

division) are added to polynomial F (line 8), the procedure must maintain the term
order imposed on the ring. The reduction process terminates when F becomes empty,
either by being reduced or moved to Rem. The zero remainder is the evidence of a
correct implementation, as discussed in Chapter 2.2.
We illustrate the GB reduction process with the example in Fig. 3.1. The initial
polynomial for this circuit is:
F = 2C + S − (a + b + c0 )

(3.5)

Equation (3.6) gives the sequence of steps that reduces F with the gate polynomials fi ∈ G for the circuit in Figure 3.1. At each step, F represents the polynomial
reduced by the previous reduction step. For brevity, the substitution is shown for a
pair of variables at once. For example, F/(C, S) means reducing variables C and S
with polynomial f8 followed by f7 . The term order given in Eqn. (3.4), imposed on
the ring, is maintained throughout the entire reduction process.
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F = 2C + S − (a + b + c0 )
1) F/( S , C ) = 2(−C1 g2 + g2 + C1 ) + (p2 g2 − p2 − g2 + 1) − (a + b + c0 )
= p2 g2 − p2 − 2g2 C1 + g2 + 2C1 − (a + b + c0 ) + 1
2) F/( p2 , g2 ) = (S1 c0 − S1 − c0 + 1)S1 c0 − (S1 c0 − S1 − c0 + 1) − 2S1 C1 c0
+ S1 c0 + 2C1 − (a + b + c0 ) + 1
= S21 c20 − S21 c0 − S1 c20 + S1 c0 − 2S1 C1 c0 + S1 + 2C1 − (a + b)
3) F/(S12 − S1 ) = −2S1 C1 c0 + S1 + 2C1 − (a + b)

(3.6)

4) F/( S1 , C1 ) = −2(p1 g1 )(−g1 + 1)c0 + p1 g1 + 2(−g1 + 1) − (a + b)
= −2(−p1 g12 + p1 g1 )c0 + p1 g1 − 2g1 − (a + b) + 2
5) F/( g12 − g1 ) = p1 g1 − 2g1 − (a + b) + 2
6) F/( p1 , g1 ) = (−ab + a + b)(−ab + 1) − 2(−ab + 1) − (a + b) + 2
= a2 b2 − a2 b − ab2 + ab
7) F/( a2 − a) = 0

The effect of field polynomials J0 =< x2 − x >, responsible for keeping each
variable Boolean, can be observed during steps 2, 4, 6 and 7, shown in bold. The
reduction terminates in Rem = 0, indicating that the circuit implements the function
indicated by the specification, a full adder.

3.3

Algebraic Rewriting

Algebraic rewriting is the process of transforming the output signature Sout into
an input signature Sin using algebraic models of the internal components (logic gates)
of the circuit. The rewriting is done in reverse topological order: from the primary
outputs (PO) to the primary inputs (PI); for this reason it is also referred to as a
backward rewriting [86]. Intermediate expressions obtained during rewriting are also
represented as polynomials, referred to as signatures, over the variables representing
the internal signals of the circuit. By construction, each variable in a given signature
(starting with Sout ) represents an output of some logic gate.
The rewriting transformation simply replaces each variable with the corresponding
algebraic expression of the logic gate. If the variable is part of a monomial involving
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other variables, the expression is multiplied by the remaining terms and expanded to
a disjunctive normal form. This is followed by a standard polynomial simplification
by combining terms with same monomials.
Algorithm 2 Algebraic Rewriting
Input: Specification polynomial Fspec ; and Gate-level netlist N
Output: (Sin == Fspec ), or the computed signature Sin
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:

Derive G={f1 ,...,fm } from N using Eqn.(6.1)
Sort G to maximize the cancellations // pre-processing
Generate Sout from N
Initialize Sig ← Sout
for fi in G do
v ← lm(fi ) // leading monomial of fi is output of a gate
if v ∈ Sig then
/* replace v with tail(fi ) in Sig */
Sig ← Sig(v ← tail(fi ))
x ← x2 // for all x in Sig
end if
end for
/* upon termination, Sig is composed of PIs only */
if Sig == Fspec return True
else return Sin = Sig
Algebraic Rewriting procedure is summarized in Algorithm 2. First, the polyno-

mial base G={f1 ,...,fm } is derived from N using Eq.(6.1), as in the GB reduction.
Then, the polynomials in G are sorted in reverse-topological order (lines 1-2). Among
several possible topological orders the one that maximizes the number of early cancellations during rewriting is sought. This has an effect of minimizing the size of
the intermediate polynomials during rewriting (the ”fat belly” effect) [86]. It is accomplished by keeping together the polynomials whose leading terms (gate outputs)
depend on common variables, as in the GB reduction. The expression to be rewritten,
Sig, is initialized with the given output signature Sout of N (lines 3-4).
The main part of the rewriting, lines 5-12, iterates over the polynomials fi ∈ G
and performs the required substitutions. Specifically, all occurrences of v = lt(fi )
in Sig are replaced by tail(fi ), followed by possible expansion of the resulting term.
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To maintain Boolean values of the variables during rewriting, the degree of each
variable in Sig is reduced to 1 (line 10). This step is equivalent to dividing Sig by
a field polynomial < x2 − x >, but it is achieved in a more efficient way. At the
end, the algorithm returns Sin as the derived signature of the circuit. If the terms of
polynomials in G are sorted in a reversed topological order, the returned polynomial
Sin contains only the primary input (PI) variables, so it can be compared with Fspec .
While the main goal of algebraic rewriting, as described by Algorithm 2, is to
determine the arithmetic function implemented by the circuit, it can also be used
to verify it against the known specification. This can be simply done by rewriting
F = Sout − Fspec and checking if it produces a zero. We will use this rewriting mode
in order to compare it against the GB reduction method in Chapter 3.2.
F = 2C + S − (a + b + c0 )
1) F/(S, C ) = 2(C1 + g2 − C1 g2 ) + (1 − (p2 + g2 − p2 g2 )) − (a + b + c0 )
= 2C1 + g2 − 2C1 g2 − p2 + p2 g2 + 1 − (a + b + c0 )
2) F/(p2 , g2 ) = 2C1 + S1 c0 − 2S1 C1 c0 − (1 − (S1 + c0 − S1 c0 ))
+ (1 − (S1 + c0 − S1 c0 ))S1 c0 + 1 − (a + b + c0 )
= 2C1 − 2S1 C1 c0 + S1 + S1 c0 − S21 c0 − S1 c20 + S21 c20 − (a + b)
= 2C1 − 2S1 C1 + S1 − (a + b)

(3.7)

3) F/(S1 , C1 ) = 2(1 − g1 ) − 2(1 − g1 )(p1 g1 )c0 + p1 g1 − (a + b)
= 2 − 2g1 − 2(p1 g1 − p1 g12 ) + p1 g1 − (a + b)
= 2 − 2g1 + p1 g1 − (a + b)
4) F/(p1 , g1 ) = 2 − 2(1 − ab) + (a + b − ab)(1 − ab) − (a + b)
= ab − a2 b − ab2 + a2 b2 = 0

We illustrate the rewriting process using the example of the gate-level full-adder
circuit in Figure 3.1. The output signature of the circuit is Sout = 2C + S, determined
by the binary encoding of the output. The specification for this circuit Fspec =
a+b+c0 . Following the ordering rules described in [86], the best rewriting order which
minimizes the size of intermediate polynomials is {(S, C), (p2 , g2 ), (S1 , C1 ), (p1 , g1 )},
as in the GB reduction. The signals shown in brackets can be rewritten in any order
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as they depend on common inputs. Equation (3.7) shows the rewriting steps for
the circuit. The terms shown in bold face indicate those that are reduced to zero
during polynomial simplification. For brevity, the substitution is shown for each pair
of variables applied at once. For example: F/(C, S) means rewriting of F using C
and S variables of polynomials f8 , f7 .
During the rewriting, two types of simplifications can be observed:
• Simplification of the terms with same monomials; for example, 2g2 − g2 = g2 ,
in Step 1. In the process, some polynomial terms are reduced to 0. This is a
common simplification applied in GB reduction as well.
• Lowering the term x2 to x, since the signal variables are binary. This can be
seen in Steps 2, 3, and 4, shown in bold face. For example, in step 2 we have:
S1 c0 − S12 c0 − S1 c20 + S12 c20 = S1 c0 − S1 c0 − S1 c0 + S1 c0 = 0. Similarly, in step
3: (p1 g1 − p1 g12 ) = p1 g1 − p1 g1 = 0, etc. This simplification is simpler and
can be executed faster than dividing the polynomials by the respective field
polynomials (x2 − x), as it is done in computer algebra approach. This is one
of the main reasons for greater efficiency of the algebraic rewriting compared to
GB reduction.
Subsequently, the final result reduces F = Sout − Fspec to zero, indicating that the
circuit correctly implements a full adder.
It should be noted that in addition to the two basic simplification rules mentioned
above (rewriting the gates with common inputs, and the x2 → x reduction), more
sophisticated simplifications can be applied to the running polynomial Sig during
rewriting by analyzing the structure of the gate-level network. For example, recognizing that some signal g is a product of XOR and AND signals with the same fanin
inputs will reduce signal g to zero. This simplification, called an XOR-AND vanishing
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rule has been used by [68], but for clarity of the above illustration, it has not been
taken into account here.

3.4

AIG Rewriting

The algebraic rewriting technique described in the previous section can be further
improved by performing rewriting using the functional AIG (Add-Inverter Graph)
representation of the circuit instead of its gate level structure. This section provides
a brief overview how this is accomplished, with details provided in [88].
AIG (And-Inverter Graph) is a combinational Boolean network composed of twoinput AND gates and inverters [11]. Each internal node of the AIG represents a
two-input AND function; the graph edges are labeled to indicate a possible inversion
of the signal. We use the cut-enumeration approach of ABC [11] to detect XOR
and Majority (MAJ) functions with a common set of variables; they are essential
components of adder trees that are present in most arithmetic circuits in some form
[88]. After detecting the XOR and MAJ components of the adder’s AIG, rewriting
skips over the detected adders, significantly speeding up the rewriting process. Figure
3.2 illustrates the process for the full adder (FA) circuit from Figure 3.1. In Figure
3.2 the groups of nodes (6,7,8) and (9,11,12) correspond to half adders (HA). The
functions rooted at nodes 6 and 9 are majority (AND) functions, and those at nodes
12 and 8 are XORs. Subsequently, the functions at node 12 (S) and node 10 (C) are
identified as XOR3 and MAJ3, respectively, on the shared inputs, a, b, c0 . The AIG
rewriting of Sout = 2C + S over the extracted XOR3 and MAJ3 nodes is trivial, with
the nonlinear monomials automatically cancelled, as shown in Eqn. 3.8.
2C + S = 2(ab + ac0 + bc0 − 2abc0 )
+ (a + b + co − 2ab − 2ac0 − 2bc0 + 4abc0 )
= a + b + co
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(3.8)

The resulting signature matches the specification, which clearly indicates that the
circuit is a full adder. As illustrated with this example, the AIG rewriting requires
considerably fewer terms than the standard algebraic rewriting.

Figure 3.2: AIG rewriting of a full adder circuit from Figure 3.1.

Data structure: AIG rewriting is implemented in ABC with the polynomial
data structure, type Pln Man t. Its main components include: 1) the AIG manager
(Gia Man) that represents the input design; and 2) two vector hash tables using type
Hsh VecMan t are used for storing the constants and monomials. The hash tables
of monomials include coefficient vectors and monomial vectors. When substitution
is applied to the leading term, new monomials will be created and the substituted
one will be removed. For example, when ab + c + bd is substituted by a = b + d,
the monomial ab is removed first, and b and bd are added to Pln Man t. During the
process of adding the new monomials, the program will first check if these monomials
already exist in Pln Man t; in this case only the coefficient of these monomials will
be changed accordingly. In this example, two new monomials are generated by the
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substitution, namely b2 , reduced to b, and bd. Since bd already exists in the expression,
the coefficient 1 of bd is replaced by 2, resulting in b + c + 2bd.

3.5

Comparison between GB Reduction and Rewriting

It should be clear from the above discussion that both methods, the GB reduction
and algebraic rewriting, are equivalent in the sense that they both perform polynomial
reduction. The GB reduction scheme achieves polynomial reduction by division,
in fact, performing Gaussian elimination. In contrast, algebraic rewriting does it
by substituting the gate output variable by the polynomial expression of the gate’s
function. While the goal of GB reduction scheme is to reduce F = Sout − Fspec
modulo the set of implementation polynomials G to 0, it can also be used to extract
the arithmetic function by reducing Sout modulo G, and interpret the result as the
functional specification of the circuit Fspec . In the algebraic rewriting scheme, the goal
is to rewrite the output signature Sout to Sin , the expression in the primary inputs,
and check if it matches the expected specification Fspec . If Sin = Fspec , the circuit is
correct; otherwise it is faulty. Alternatively, as illustrated above, algebraic rewriting
can be also applied to F = Sout − Fspec , as in the GB approach.
Variable substitution of algebraic rewriting (line 9 of Algorithm 2) seems simpler
than the main step of polynomial division of the GB reduction (line 8 of Algorithm 1).
On the other hand, it requires additional multiplication of the terms and expansion
into a sum of products. Hence, the complexity of these steps is comparable. Both
methods avoid explicit computation of Gröbner basis, but achieve it by different
means. In the GB reduction it is done by setting the variable order in the ring so that
all variables are in reverse topological order, which makes the implementation set G a
Gröbner basis. In the algebraic rewriting scheme on the other hand, the polynomials
fi ∈ G are sorted in reverse topological order to effect the rewriting. As a result,
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both methods ensure that the polynomial base is a Gröbner basis. However, there
are some essential differences between the two methods that affect their efficiency.
• The GB reduction scheme requires the field polynomials J0 =< x2 − x > to be
added to the base G in order to keep the variables Boolean. This increases the
size of the Gröbner basis and results in a larger search space in each iteration.
Whereas in the rewriting scheme, the reduction by < x2 − x > is solved in a
simpler way, namely by lowering x2 to x via a simple data structure (line 10 in
Algorithm 2).
• In the algebraic rewriting scheme, the gate polynomials fi ∈ G are ordered in
reverse topological order (line 5 in Algorithm 2) so that each gate polynomial fi
is used exactly once. Furthermore, the selected polynomial is used to perform
the rewriting by a simple string substitution and is never needed again. In
contrast, in each iteration of the GB reduction one has to search for a polynomial
fi that divides the leading term of F under reduction. While in principle the
GB reduction can also work over an ordered list of gate polynomials, this does
not apply to the field polynomials < x2 − x >, needed for the reduction. Since
the appearance of intermediate signals in nonlinear terms xk is unpredictable,
it is impossible to pre-order the list of field polynomials in GB reduction.
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show the verification results for multipliers mapped onto standard cells with three different libraries, including simple two-input gates and industrial libraries of 14 nm and 7 nm nodes. The table also compares the results with
the open source tools of [66][65]. The first group of four designs in the table, labeled
*-nomap, are the circuits synthesized without technology mapping. The three circuits
in the second group, labeled *-map-simple, are synthesized and mapped onto a simple library of two-input gates. The last group of four circuits, labeled *-map-14nm,
contains designs that were synthesized and mapped onto a 14 nm industrial library.
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For these circuits we executed several iterations of dch and strash commands before
applying ARTi to eliminate extra logic introduced for meeting timing constraints. As
can be seen from the tables, our algebraic rewriting is significantly more efficient than
those using computer algebra, GB-reduction based approach.
Table 3.1: CPU verification time (in seconds) of synthesized and technology mapped
multipliers using different libraries. #GT = Number of gate types. FI≥5 = Number
of gates with fanin≥5.
Designs
ARTi
btor64-resyn3-nomap
0.1
abc64-resyn3-nomap
0.1
btor128-resyn3-nomap
0.3
abc128-resyn3-nomap
0.1
btor64-resyn3-map-simple
0.3
abc64-resyn3-map-simple
0.1
abc128-resyn3-map-simple
1.8
abc64-resyn3-map-14nm
29
abc64-resyn3-map-7nm
MO
abc128-resyn3-map-14nm
400
abc128-resyn3-map-7nm
MO

#GT FI≥5 [66] [65]
711 4.2
801 4.0
ES
ES
ES
ES
7
0
1073 418
7
0
1071 415
7
0
ES
ES
15
17
TO TO
24
9,791 TO TO
15
1,008
ES
ES
23
26,600 ES
ES

Table 3.2: CPU verification time (in seconds) for multipliers prior to synthesis.
ES = Error State reported by Singular.
Design
btor-16
btor-32
btor-64
btor-128
sp-ar-rc16
sp-ar-rc32
sp-ar-rc64
sp-ar-rc128
abc-256
abc-512

ARTi
0.01
0.02
0.1
0.5
0.01
0.1
0.4
1.6
0.7
3.7
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[66]
0.5
11.7
725
ES
1.1
35.5
1312
ES
ES
ES

[65]
0.01
0.3
4.0
ES
0.01
0.3
4.6
ES
ES
ES

3.6

The Bit-flow Model

This section offers a new insight into an arithmetic circuit verification problem, in
which the computation performed by the circuit is treated as the flow of digital data.
The goal here is not to introduce any new algorithms, but to suggest an interpretation
how the computation propagates in an arithmetic circuit. This interpretation will
then provide an argument for soundness and completeness of the algebraic rewriting
method, independently from the computer algebra arguments.
The circuit is modeled as an acyclic network of logic and/or arithmetic components
connected via electrical signals or wires. Mathematically, the signals are represented
as variables, denoted X; they include the internal signals, the primary inputs (PI),
and the primary outputs (PO). The terms signals and variables will be used interchangeably, depending on the context (structural vs. functional view of the circuit).
Each component of the circuit is described by its characteristic function, a pseudoBoolean polynomial function relating the component’s inputs to its outputs. The
characteristic functions of Boolean logic gates are provided by Equation 6.1. For example, the characteristic function of an OR gate z = a ∨ b is z = a + b − ab. Similarly,
the characteristic function of a half adder (HA) is 2C + S = a + b, etc.
The generic term flow is intuitively understood as a movement of some physical
entity (such as current or fluid) through the network. Here, it is a movement of
digital data (voltage potentials taking value 0 or 1) whose capacity is measured in
bits, where each bit contributes one unit of flow to its value. The flow starts at the
primary inputs and propagates towards the primary outputs, distributed internally
according to the characteristic functions of the circuit components. For example, a
full adder accepts an in-flow of three bits, a, b, c and ”distributes” this flow to the
outputs according to its characteristic function: a + b + c = 2C + S. The coefficient
associated with each variable represents its ”capacity”, the maximum value of the
flow that can pass through the corresponding signal. In a half-adder or a full-adder,
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the weight of each input bit is 1, and the weight of the output bits C and S are 2
and 1, respectively. For a logic gate, the inputs and the output bits have a weight of
1 each.
The idea of using the flow conservation law to verify arithmetic circuits has already
been proposed in [21]. However, it is applicable there only to arithmetic circuits
composed of half- and full-adders, where the circuit elements and the specification
are modeled as linear expressions. Here, we extend this idea to an arbitrary integer
arithmetic circuit which computes an arithmetic function as a polynomial.
The value of the flow in the circuit is captured by the polynomials (signatures)
generated during the algebraic rewriting. Equations (3.6) and (3.7) are examples of
such polynomials. The value of the flow at the primary inputs is represented by the
specification polynomial Fspec , while the value of the flow at the primary outputs is
represented by the output signature Sout . The value of the flow at an arbitrary cut
of the circuit (defined below) is represented by a polynomial in terms of the variables
associated with the respective signals of the circuit. It can be computed from the
polynomial generated at each step of the algebraic rewriting. We shall show that the
value of the flow in an arithmetic circuit represented by such polynomials is invariant
throughout the circuit.
In principle, the circuit can be composed of arbitrary components, with singleoutput logic gates as well as multiple-output arithmetic modules, such as half- and
full-adders; or any module for which the I/O relationship can be defined as a polynomial. Here we limit our attention to gate-level arithmetic circuits with single-output
logic gates. In the remainder of this section, any reference to polynomials Si , Sin ,
Sout or Fspec assumes that they are reduced over the field polynomials < x2 − x >,
which is implicitly achieved by replacing x2 with x during the algebraic rewriting
(refer to Section 3.3). It should be clear that the value of the flow is not affected by
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this transformation or by any simplification which removes the terms that evaluate
to zero, since it does not change the value of the polynomial.
Consider a polynomial Pi generated at step i of the algebraic rewriting process.
It can be observed that the variables Xi that are in the support set of Pi correspond
to a cut in the circuit. Using network flow terminology, the cut is a set of signals that
partitions the circuit into two subsets: one containing the gates whose inputs are
transitively connected to the primary inputs P I, and the other containing the gates
whose outputs are transitively connected to the primary outputs P O. This separation
is an inherent property of backward rewriting: starting with the output signature
polynomial Pi = Sout , a variable xk ∈ Xi of Pi that represents an output of some
gate gk is replaced by the polynomial in its inputs. From the structural viewpoint,
this moves the cut from the gate output to its inputs. From this perspective, the
polynomial Pi can also be viewed as a signature of the cut Ci , denoted Si .
Polynomial expressions in Eqn. (3.6) and (3.7) are examples of cut signatures for
the full adder circuit of Figure 3.1. The input and output signatures, Sin and Sout
defined earlier, are the signatures of the boundary cuts, associated with the primary
inputs P I and primary outputs P O, respectively. The following example illustrates
the relationship between the polynomial and cut rewriting.

Figure 3.3: Cut rewriting in a full-adder circuit.

Example 1: Figure 3.3 shows a full adder circuit (FA) with a set of cuts. The
signatures {Sout , S4 , S3 , S2 , S1 , Sin }, associated with cuts {Cut5 , ...., Cut0 }, are given
in Eqn. 3.9. They are obtained by successively rewriting the output signature Sout =
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2C + S of Cut5 through the circuit. Specifically, the signature Sout is transformed
into signature S4 of Cut4 by replacing variable C with the expression of the OR gate,
C = g + t − gt, resulting in the signature S4 = 2(g + t − gt) + S. This signature
is then transformed into S3 by rewriting across the AND gate, t = cp, etc., until
it reaches the primary inputs. The following signatures are obtained by successive
rewriting of the circuit, in the order consistent with the ordering rules discussed in
Section 3.3. Furthermore, the expression for S3 is reduced here by applying XORAND simplification rule of [68], namely pg = 0.

Sout = 2C + S
S4 = 2(g + t − gt) + S
S3 = 2(cp + g − cpg) + S
= 2(cp + g) + S

(3.9)

S2 = c + p + 2g
S1 = c + p + 2ab
Sin = c + a + b
Note that, in contrast to the network flow model of [21], the signature Si of some cut
Ci is not a linear combination of its signals Xi , but in general a nonlinear polynomial
Si in variables X.
We now introduce the notion of the flow value, a measure of the capacity of the
bit-flow across a cut.
Definition 1: The value of a cut Ci with signature Si for a given assignment of
variables Xi is the value of its signature Si evaluated at Xi . It is denoted as V (Si )(Xi ).
One should keep in mind that the values of variables Xi of a cut cannot be arbitrary
but can assume only those values that can be derived from the bit values of P I. To
this effect, we introduce the following definition.
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Definition 2: The assignment of variables in Xi is called legal, denoted by [Xi ], if it
is derived from an assignment of the primary inputs, XP I . In this case we say that
[Xi ] is compatible with XP I .
With this we will use the notation V (Si )[Xi ] to denote the value of the cut only
for legal assignment of Xi . We can then say that two assignments, [Xi ], [Xj ], are
compatible if they are both derived from the same values XP I .
The reason for introducing the concept of legality is that one can only reason
about the flow through the cuts for only those values of signals that are actually
generated by the circuit.
Example 2: Table 3.3 shows the flow values for the FA circuit in Figure 3.7 at each
cut for all possible PI assignments. These values are obtained by simply substituting
given values of [Xi ] into the expression of Si .
Table 3.3: Flow values of cuts in the correct circuit. S5 = Sout = 2C + S; S0 = Sin =
a + b + c = Fspec
c
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1

P Is
a
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1

b
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1

Intermediate
p g
t
0 0
0
1 0
0
1 0
0
0 1
0
0 0
0
1 0
1
1 0
1
0 1
0

P Os
C S
0 0
0 1
0 1
1 0
0 1
1 0
1 0
1 1

S5
0
1
1
2
1
2
2
3

Flow value V (Si ) at Cuti
S4 S3 S2 S1 S0 Fspec
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3

An important observation is that, for a given assignment of XP I , the values of all
cuts (and of their signatures) are invariant.
Definition 3: Two cuts, Ci , Cj , with signatures Si , Sj , are congruent, denoted Ci ∼
=
Cj , if for every pair of compatible assignments, [Xi ], [Xj ], their values are the same,
i.e., V (Si )[Xi ] = V (Sj )[Xj ]. In this case, we also say that the corresponding signatures
are congruent, denoted Si ∼
= Sj .
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Theorem 1: Given a pair of cuts Ci , Cj , such that Ci is transformed into Cj or,
equivalently, Si rewritten into Sj by algebraic rewriting, the two cuts are congruent.
That is Si −→ Sj =⇒ Si ∼
= Sj .
Proof. A cut Ci (Xi ) can be transformed into another cut Cj (Xj ) by a series of algebraic rewriting transformations over logic gates, each described by some polynomial
g = v − tail(g). During rewriting, every occurrence of variable v in the source cut
(initially Ci ) is replaced by tail(g) in the target cut (finally Cj ). Since polynomial
g satisfies the relation g = v − tail(g) = 0, provided by Eq. (1), then v = tail(g).
Consequently, V (Si ) = V (Sj ) for all values of variables v and those in tail(g) that
satisfy this relation. Hence, V (Si )[Xi ] = V (Sj )[Xj ] for all compatible assignments
[Xi ], [Xj ], and thus by Definition 6 they are congruent, Si ∼
= Sj .
Example 3: Theorem 1 states an important property of bit-flow conservation across
the cuts in an arithmetic circuit. Table 3.3 gives the values of individual cuts for the
full-adder circuit in Figure 3.3. As we can see, the signature value of each cut in the
original (correct) circuit, including the inputs and output signatures are the same for
all primary input assignments.
Notice that two cuts may be congruent even if one cannot be obtained from the
other by rewriting. For example, in Figure 3.3, Cut3 = {S, c, p, g} and cut {p, c, t, g}
(crossing each other, not shown in the figure) cannot be derived from each other since
there are no gates that can transform one into another; yet, they are also congruent
since each can be derived by a rewriting of Sout , albeit through a different set of gates.
To that effect, we have the following Corollary:
Corollary 1: All cuts in the circuit are mutually congruent. In particular, Sout ∼
= Sin .
Proof. By Theorem 1, any cut Ci in the circuit is congruent with the cut at the
primary outputs, P O, because it can be obtained by backward rewriting from P O.
Any other cut, Cj , is also congruent to P O. That is, by the definition of congruence,
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V (Si )[Xi ] = V (SP O )[XP O ] and V (Sj )[Xj ] = V (SP O )[XP O ], and hence Si ∼
= Sj , for
any cuts Ci , Cj , including Sin and Sout . As a result, all the cuts are congruent and
form an equivalence class.
Corollary 1 basically states that the value of the flow measured at any cut in the
circuit is constant throughout the circuit.
We now need to discuss how to distinguish a circuit that is functionally correct
from the circuit that is faulty. The circuit is said to be functionally correct if its
implementation satisfies the specification; or, equivalently, that the values computed
by the circuit are the same as those provided by the specification for all possible
input assignments. Using the terminology of algebraic rewriting we can formalize
this definition as follows:
Definition 4: The circuit is functionally correct if, for each primary input assignment, XP I , the result encoded in the primary outputs XP O satisfies the condition
V (Sout )[XP O ] = V (Fspec )[XP I ].
The following theorem specifies the sufficient and necessary condition for the functional correctness of a circuit.
Theorem 2: The circuit is functionally correct if and only if the input signature,
Sin , computed by algebraic rewriting of the output signature, Sout , is the same as the
functional specification, i.e., if Sin = Fspec .
Proof. The if part (soundness): let Sin = Fspec , which implies that V (Sin ) = V (Fspec )
for all possible primary input assignments, XP I . Since, by Corollary 1, Sin ∼
= Sout ,
i.e., V (Sin ) = V (Sout ), we have V (Sout ) = V (Fspec ) for all possible values of XP I .
That is, the circuit is functionally correct.
The only if part (completeness): Let the circuit be functionally correct, i.e.,
V (Sout ) = V (Fspec ) for all values of XP I . Since Sout ∼
= Sin , we have V (Sin ) = V (Fspec )
for all the assignment of inputs XP I . This in turn implies that Sin = Fspec . Furthermore, the rewriting procedure always terminates: the circuit as a DAG has no
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loops and the number of rewriting steps is equal to the number of gates. Hence, the
method is also complete.
It should be emphasized that the above argument is only valid for pseudo-Boolean
polynomials, reduced over field polynomials J0 . It is known that such polynomials
have unique polynomial representation, so that two polynomials will evaluate to the
same value only if they are the same.
Example 4: To illustrate the case of a faulty circuit, where Sin 6= Fspec , consider
again the full adder example in Figure 3.3 in which the AND gate g = ab has been
replaced with an OR gate, g = a + b − ab. This causes the signatures of the cuts to
change, as follows (note that in this circuit the AND-XOR simplification pg = 0 does
not apply):
Sout = 2C + S
S4 = 2(g + t − gt) + S
S3 = 2(cp + g − cpg) + S
(3.10)
S2 = c + p + 2g − 2cpg
S1 = c + p + 2(a + b − ab) − 2cp(a + b − ab)
Sin = c + 3(a + b) − 4ab − 2c(a + b − 2ab)
The input signature obtained by this rewriting is now: Sin = c + 3(a + b) − 4ab −
2c(a + b − 2ab), which does not match the circuit specification, Fspec = a + b + c.
The flow values for each cut, for each assignment XP I , are shown in Table 3.4. The
table confirms that all the cuts {S5 , S4 , S3 , S2 , S1 , S0 } are congruent; and the flow
value at any of the cuts, according to Theorem 1, is constant for any P I assignment.
However, the flow value for some assignments of XP I is different than in the correct
circuit (shown in column Fspec ), proving that the circuit is faulty.
In summary, in the circuit that computes a polynomial, the value of the flow from
P I to P O is constant throughout the entire circuit. In the functionally correct circuit
the value of the flow equals that of Fspec ; in a faulty circuit the flow value is different
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Table 3.4: Flow values in faulty circuit (gate AND of g replaced by OR); S5 = Sout =
2C + S; S0 = Sin 6= Fspec
c
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1

P Is
a
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1

b
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1

Intermediate
p
g
t
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0

P Os
C
S
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
1

S5
0
3
3
2
1
2
2
3

Flow value V (Si ) at
S4
S3
S2
S1
0
0
0
0
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3

Cuti
S0
Fspec
0
0
3
1
3
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
3

than that of Fspec , while all the cuts remain congruent. If the circuit is correct, Sin
will match the specification, Fspec ; otherwise, the algorithm will report the circuit as
faulty and will return the computed signature Sin .
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CHAPTER 4
VERIFICATION OF TRUNCATED ARITHMETIC
CIRCUITS

In this chapter, we present an approach for formal verification of truncated multipliers that perform approximate integer multiplication. This method is based on
extracting polynomial signature of the truncated multiplier using algebraic rewriting,
discussed in Chapter 3. To efficiently compute the polynomial signature, a multiplier reconstruction is proposed to construct the complete, precise multiplier from
the truncated one. This method has been tested on multipliers up to 256 bits with
three truncation schemes: Deletion, D-truncation, and Truncation with Rounding.
Experimental results are compared with the state-of-the-art SAT, SMT, and computer algebraic solvers.

4.1

Problem Statement

The traditional verification methods discussed in Chapter 1.2 are not applicable
to large arithmetic circuits as they require ”bit-blasting”, causing memory overload.
Even more so, they also fail when dealing with large truncated arithmetic circuits.
Even the state-of-the-art SAT solvers cannot solve verification problem of a 16-bit
truncated multiplier.
The computer algebra approaches discussed in Chapter 3 can successfully verify large arithmetic circuits, such as 512-bit multipliers. However, when verifying
truncated arithmetic circuits, in particular truncated multipliers, these methods face
serious memory problem. Even for verifying a 8-bit truncated multiplier, the system
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Figure 4.1: Complete half adder.

runs out of 16 GB memory with an inconclusive result. This is because truncation
prevents polynomial cancellations and simplifications that naturally occur during the
rewriting process [86]. For example, a complete half-adder (HA) in Figure 4.1 consists
of an XOR for the sum and an AND for the carry, while the truncation process makes
some of the HAs in the original circuit incomplete (with the XOR or the AND gate
removed). The algebraic models of XOR (a ⊕ b = a + b − 2ab) and AND (a · b = ab)
gates of the HA are nonlinear, but when they are added together with correct weights,
the resulting polynomial becomes linear: 2C +S = 2·(ab)+(a+b−2ab) = a+b. This
naturally occurs during HA rewriting in a ”complete” arithmetic circuits. Whereas
in the case of a truncated circuit, some of the output bits are truncated, and the corresponding gates (mainly XORs) computing those bits will be removed. The above
linear relationship is then broken, and the non-linear term ab remains and gets expanded by further rewriting of variables a and b in the polynomial expression. This
causes an exponential increase in the size of intermediate polynomials, resulting in
memory explosion.
To address this issue, a multiplier reconstruction approach is used to construct a
complete, precise multiplier from the truncated one. The method consists of three
basic steps: 1) determine the weights (binary encoding) of the output bits; 2) reconstruct the truncated multiplier using functional merging and re-synthesis; and 3)
construct the polynomial signature of the resulting circuit. The details are discussed
in Section 4.3.
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Figure 4.2: Partial product array of a 8-bit multiplier.

4.2

Formal Truncation Schemes

Three formal truncation schemes used to design truncated multipliers are: Deletion, D-truncation and Rounding. An example of truncated multiplier is shown in
Fig. 4.2. Normally, a 2n-bit output is generated for a regular n×n multiplier, whereas
in this case only n most significant bits (MSBs) are computed. A multiplier that has
the same bit-width in their input and output is called a fixed-width multiplier, which
is mainly used in this chapter. In this example, the inputs a[n-1:0] and b[n-1:0] are
assumed to be two integer inputs. The partial products are divided into two subsets:
1. The most significant partial products (MSPPs), corresponding to n MSBs; and,
2. The least significant partial products (LSPPs), further subdivided into LSPP major
and LSPP minor, corresponding to the k most significant columns of LSPPs and
the remaining (nk) columns, respectively.
In Deletion scheme, the partial products in LSPP minor, which have a small impact
on the accuracy of the result, are discarded. The corresponding PPs are dropped to
prevent the carry chain from propagating further. This decreases the size of the carry
chain, which reduces the delay and power (the main reason for applying truncation).
Even though LSPP minor have a smaller contribution to the accuracy of the MSBs,
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the error of discarding them can be high; in the worst case it is 7 · 28 for an 8-bit
fixed-width multiplier. To rectify this, a compensatory circuit is typically added after
deletion [60][75].
In D−truncation scheme, some output bits computed by LSPPs are truncated without modifying the entire carry chain. In contrast to the Deletion scheme, which
improves performance and saves power, D-truncation does not change the functionality of the remaining circuit. Instead, it only removes these truncated bits and the
associated gates. The purpose of D-truncation is to manage the number of output
bits, i.e., maintaining the number of input and output bits to be the same. Although
D-truncation will not affect the accuracy of the MSBs, the error due to losing the
information in LSPPs is (28 − 1) in the worst case.
Rounding scheme is often introduced to achieve further accuracy and truncation
[31]. Instead of truncating all columns in LSPP major, some of the most significant columns in LSPP major are kept for the rounding circuit. The value of those
columns in LSPP major is rounded into MSPPs.

4.3

Verifying Different Truncation Schemes

In this section, we describe two basic techniques, f unctional merging and resynthesis, used to verify truncated multipliers. We introduce a Partial Product
Detector (PPD) which assigns correct weights to the respective output bits. In order to better understand how PPD works, we analyze in Section 4.3.1 a truncated
multiplier designed with only the Deletion scheme. In Section 4.3.2, we consider a
truncated multiplier designed with only the D-truncation scheme and describe the
details of functional merging and re-synthesis. Lastly, we propose a comprehensive
verification analysis where all truncation schemes are combined together. Fig. 4.4
shows the verification flowchart of our methodology applicable to a general truncated
multiplier. Two assumptions are made:
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• The compensatory circuits for Deletion and Rounding can be extracted from
the high-level synthesis netlist, and represented as polynomials in the primary
inputs.
• The bit position of primary inputs (a[n-1 : 0], b[n-1 : 0]) is known, so that the
weights of the partial products are also known.

4.3.1

Deletion Scheme only

In the Deletion scheme, some of the partial products are removed to reduce the
circuit complexity at the expense of accuracy. For example, in Fig. 4.2, six of the
partial products in LSPP minor are removed, and the logic columns P O0 , P O1 and
P O2 in the shaded area will disappear. As a result, there is no carry feed into the
P O3 column. Hence, the remaining adder tree still executes complete additions (the
remaining HA/FA blocks are complete). In this case, there is no polynomial size
explosion, since all additions preserve polynomial eliminations during the rewriting
process. This means that function extraction is sufficient to extract the input signature of the circuit.
In Fig. 4.2, when the logic cones associated with LSPP minor columns are removed, P O3 corresponds to the current LSB. Hence, the weight of the current LSB
that was 23 in the exact multiplier is shifted to 20 . The computed input signature
will never match the specification until all the output bits are assigned their original
weight. Moreover, additional polynomials representing those removed partial products must be added. In this case, PPD performs the following functions (Algorithm
3):
• Assign the correct/original weight to each current output bit.
• Detect the deleted elements in LSPP minor and generates additional polynomials.
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Algorithm 3 Weight Determination and Signature Generation
Input: Gate-level netlist of truncated multiplier
Output: Correct weight of each output bit
Output: Additional polynomials representing the removed partial products
1: PO={P O0 , P O1 , ..., P Oc }: current output bits of truncated multiplier
2: for i ← 0 to 2n − 1 do
3:
Create listi corresponding to logic column i
4:
for j ← 0 to i; k ← 0 to i; j + k ← 0 to i do
5:
Search partial product aj bk in the netlist
6:
if partial product aj bk exists then
7:
Save product aj bk into listi
8:
else Additional Polynomials ← Additional Polynomials + 2i aj bk
9:
end if
10:
end for
11:
Number of Total PPs ← Number of Total PPs + length(listi )
12:
Rank of Logic Column ← i
13:
Save Pairi (Rank of Logic Column, Number of Total PPs)
14: end for
15: for i ← 0 to c do
16:
Search and count the number of PPs that current output bit P Oi depends on
17:
Match the count with Number of Total PPs in Pairs
18:
return Rank of Logic Column
19:
Assign correct weight Wi ← 2Rank of Logic Column
20: end for
21: return Correct weights W={W0 , W1 , ..., Wc } and Additional Polynomials

In general, for an Na ×Nb -bit multiplier, Algorithm 3 will search Na +Nb logic
columns. Specifically, for a 8-bit multiplier shown in Fig 4.2, it searches 2 × 8 = 16
logic columns, P O0 to P O15 . The results of applying Algorithm 3 to this example
are shown in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: The relationship between RLC and NTPP.
RLC: Rank of Logic Column, NTPP : Number of Total PPs

RLC
0
1
2
3
4

NTPP
0
0
0
4
9

RLC
5
6
7
8
9

NTPP
15
22
30
37
43

RLC
10
11
12
13
14,15

NTPP
48
52
55
57
58

To assign the correct weight for each output bit, we traverse and count all those
PPs on which that output bit depends. This information is stored in Table 4.1, which
shows for each output bits (rank of logic column, RLC) the number of total PPs
(N T P P ) that it depends on. Since all PPs in the LSPP minor logic were removed,
N T P P for RLC = 0, 1, 2 is 0. To find the weight of the current LSB of this truncated
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multiplier, we examine the PPs that this bit depends on. In this case, four PPs have
been found, namely a0 b4 , a1 b3 , a2 b2 , a3 b1 , a4 b0 . We then examine Table 4.1 to find
which bit (RLC) depends on N T P P = 4. It turns out that RLC = 3 in this case,
which means the current LSB of this truncated multiplier is the P O3 of the complete
multiplier. Hence, the correct weight for this bit must be 23 .
In the same way, we can assign the correct weights to the other output bits. For
example, if we determine that one of the output bits depends on 15 PPs, then the
correct weight of that output bit is 25 , since RLC for N T P P = 15 is 5. Furthermore,
those 15 partial products consist of 6 PPs in P O5 logic column, 5 PPs in P O4 and 4
PPs in P O3 .
Algorithm 3 explains a general idea of how the PPD works. However, a special
case needs to be discussed. Notice that the two MSBs P O14 and P O15 depend on
the same number of partial products, that is 58, as shown in Table 4.1. In such a
one-to-two mapping problem, PPD will determine the correct weight according to the
information of the circuit. That is, the output bit with the higher rank is assigned
the higher weight, that is 215 , and the other output bit as 214 .
Once all the output bits have been assigned their correct weights, we can then
apply function extraction to compute the input signature. Notice that the boundary
between LSPP minor and LSPP major does not necessarily have to be straight (along
the column lines). As long as the correct weight of each output bit is assigned and
the LSPP minor has been detected, the calculated signature will always be correct.
While searching each logic column, the discarded/undetected partial products will
be added as additional polynomial at the end of the signature calculation, with the
corresponding coefficients. In this case, the additional polynomial will be 22 (a2 b0 +
a1 b1 + a0 b2 ) + 21 (a1 b0 + a0 b1 ) +20 a0 b0 . The polynomial of the compensatory circuit D
also need to be considered, if it exists. The size of the compensatory circuit depends
upon the number of partial products removed. The worst case size occurs when k = 0,
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that is, when all the LSPPs are removed. However, the bigger the compensatory
circuit, the harder the verification process is. In the worst case scenario, most of the
time is spent on computing D. Therefore, if the size of the compensatory circuit is
too big, we need to remove it before the rewriting process.
Finally, we compare: 1) the calculated polynomial of the truncated circuit expanded by additional polynomial, with 2) the sum of full multiplier specification and
polynomial D. The reason for doing this, is that the compensatory circuit is included
in the truncated circuit. This operation is trivial when there is no compensatory
circuit (D = 0). If the two polynomials are equal, the given circuit is proved to be a
Deletion-based truncated multiplier.

4.3.2

D-truncation scheme only

D-truncation is the process in which some of the output bits are removed without
changing the functionality of the remaining output bits. A fixed-width multiplier can
be built by simply applying the D-truncation scheme to a regular multiplier. For
example, in Fig. 4.2, assuming that k = 8, no partial product is removed and 8 LSBs
are truncated. Although the functionality of the remaining 8 MSBs has not changed,
the entire structure of adder tree is no longer complete. For example, assume that one
output bit is computed by the XOR gate of a HA block. When this bit is truncated,
the XOR gate will be automatically removed from the circuit because it is redundant.
However, the AND gate will remain to preserve the carry chain.
In this example, the XOR gates directly connected to P O2 to P O7 will disappear
due to D-truncation. The remaining AND gates make the structure of adder tree
incomplete. The nonlinear terms of polynomials, which were supposed to be canceled,
will propagate during the backward rewriting. This leads to an exponential increase in
memory size, potentially ending up in a memory explosion. In other words, we cannot
directly apply function extraction to such a circuit. To efficiently apply function
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extraction, our approach transforms the incomplete function into a complete one.
This is achieved by functional merging, followed by re-synthesis of the combined
circuit by ABC [50].

Figure 4.3: Functional Merging and Re-synthesis.

To better explain this idea, we use a 2×2 multiplier in Fig. 4.3 as an illustrative
example. A 2-bit truncated multiplier (with two LSBs truncated) is presented in
Fig. 4.3(a). Assume that Fig. 4.3(a) represents the circuit to be verified if it is a 2-bit
fixed-width multiplier. We use Algorithm 1 to determine the correct weights of this
circuit. After reading the gate-level netlist, PPD assigns weight 23 to m1 and 22 to
m0. Then, we generate a regular 2×2 multiplier and remove the output bits with
weights 22 and 23 . The generated circuit is shown in Fig. 4.3(b), whose weight of
m10 is 21 and of m00 is 20 . Finally, we apply our scheme of functional merging and
re-synthesis resulting in the circuit in Fig. 4.3(c). The red (shaded) part in this figure
corresponds to the generated corrective circuit of Fig. 4.3(b).
If the re-synthesized circuit proves to be a 2×2 multiplier by algebraic polynomial
rewriting, this means that the given circuit in Fig. 4.3(a) is indeed a truncated multiplier. This is because the circuit generated in Fig. 4.3(b) has a correct function of
two LSBs in a regular 2×2 multiplier. If, and only if, the circuit in Fig. 4.3(a) has
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the function of two MSBs of a regular 2×2 multiplier, the re-synthesized circuit can
be a 2×2 multiplier.
In general, for a given circuit X that needs to be verified whether it is the Dtruncation-based multiplier or not, we first calculate the correct weights for each
output bit by PPD. Then, we generate a regular multiplier and truncate those output
bits that have the same weight as the ones in circuit X. The generated circuit
should have the same number of input bits as circuit X. After functional merging
and re-synthesis, the number of output bits in the re-synthesized circuit is equal to
the sum of output bits in the given circuit X and the generated circuit, as shown
in Fig. 4.3. Finally we apply function extraction (backward rewriting) to the resynthesized circuit. If the computed signature matches the specification of a regular
multiplier, the functionality of circuit X as truncated multiplier is confirmed.
The goal of functional merging is to find the maximum functional similarity between the given circuit and the generated corrective circuit. The merging eliminates
as much as possible incomplete addition in the given circuit to speed up function
extraction. Resynthesis (performed using ABC [50]) transforms the two circuits into
And-Inverter-Graphs (AIGs) and performs sweeping, redundancy removal, common
logic identification, etc. If the two circuits (the original one and the reconstructed
one) have been built in the same way, resynthesis in effect transforms the structure
of the original circuit into the circuit performing a complete arithmetic function.
Despite ABC being the state-of-the-art synthesis and verification tool, it could
not solve the equivalence checking problem for two different 12-bit truncated multipliers. In contrast, our approach is scalable and can be used to verify truncated
multipliers up to 256 bits. The success of such verification depends on the local
structural similarity between the original and the generated corrective circuit. Such
a similarity assumption is acceptable, especially in industry. For example, designer
of the fixed-width multiplier may have access to the original regular multiplier. If the

55

designer use the structure of the regular multiplier to build the generated circuit, as in
Fig. 4.3(b), the problem can be solved very fast. This is also true even if the original
circuit and the generated circuit are not built using the same algorithm but exhibit
enough local functional similarity. The speed of applying function extraction to the
re-synthesized circuit will be much higher than directly applying function extraction
to the original circuit. This is because more nonlinear terms will be canceled during
polynomial rewriting. However, one cannot reconstruct a circuit without considering
the algorithm that was used to design it. For example, functional merging between a
Booth-Multiplier and non-Booth multiplier may make the process fail.
Another significant contribution of this approach is that we can verify a multiplier
whose arbitrarily output bits have been truncated. For example in Fig. 4.3(a), PPD
can assign the correct weight to each of the output bits. We can then generate a
regular 2×2 multiplier and truncate those output bits that have the same weight as
the one in the given circuit. Therefore, we don’t need to know which output bits are
truncated. Instead, we can automatically detect arbitrarily truncated bits and follow
the same procedure as described earlier.
A special case in weight determination is when either the MSB or (MSB-1)th
bit has been truncated. Since these two bits depend on all the PPs, PPD cannot
tell which one is truncated. In this case, we will generate two circuits: one circuit
assuming that MSB is truncated, and the other circuit assuming that (MSB-1)th bit
is truncated. In this case, both circuits are reconstructed, and only if either of them
turns out to be a regular multiplier, we conclude that the given circuit is a truncated
multiplier.

4.3.3

Deletion + D-truncation + Rounding

In this section, we discuss the case when a truncated multiplier is designed using
all of the three truncation schemes, Deletion, D-truncation, and Rounding. Partial
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product detector (PPD), functional merging, and re-synthesis can still be used along
with the function extraction to solve the verification problem. Fig. 4.4 shows the
verification flow of our methodology applicable to the Deletion only, D-truncation
only, and a combination of these two schemes.
LSPP_minor
Determination
Original
Circuit

PPs
Detection

Calculate
Additional Polys
Generate
Corrective Circuit

Output weights
Determination
Compensatory
Polynomials with
Speciﬁcation

Function
Extraction
Functional Merging
& Re-synthesis

=?

Extracted
Polynomial

Figure 4.4: Verification Flow dealing with all truncation schemes.
An 8-bit fixed-width multiplier is used as an example for the analysis of these
truncation schemes. Assume that six of the partial products in LSPP minor are
removed, as shown in Fig. 4.2. Therefore, the output bits associated with P O0 , P O1 ,
and P O2 will disappear due to Deletion. Then, five output bits, corresponding to logic
columns P O3 to P O7 , will be removed using D-truncation and Rounding scheme.
In the verification flow, PPD detects the elements in LSPP minor and assigns a
correct weight to each of the output bits. Then, we generate a regular multiplier
which has the same number of inputs as the original circuit. An additional step,
which is different from the analysis in Section 4.3, is as follows. We discard the
undetected PPs in the generated circuit so that the PPs in the generated circuit and
the PPs in the original circuit are the same. After that, the generated circuit has 5
output bits, corresponding to P O3 to P O7 , while the original circuit has 8 output bits,
corresponding to P O8 to P O15 . We then apply functional merging and re-synthesis
to the combined circuit.
Finally, we calculate the polynomials as shown in Fig. 4.4, and compare the following two terms: 1) the computed signature of the re-synthesized circuit with additional
polynomials representing the undetected PPs (LSPP minor); with 2) the specifica-
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tion of the regular 8-bit multiplier enlarged by the polynomials of the compensatory
circuits. Upon being equal, the given circuit is proved to be an 8-bit fixed-width
multiplier. Experiments were performed on a Baugh-Wooley multiplier and a CSA
array multiplier for up to 256 bits.

4.4

Results

The partial product detector (PPD) in the proposed method has been implemented in Python. ABC, a popular synthesis and verification tool [50] was used to
implement the functional merging and re-synthesis. We performed our experiments
on an Intel Core CPU i5-3470 @ 3.20 GHz 4 with 15.6 GB memory. Experiments
are performed on a Baugh-Wooley multiplier and a CSA multiplier for up to 256
bits. The Baugh-Wooley multiplier is a modified non-Booth unsigned multiplier using Baugh-Wooley scheme. CSA multiplier implemented in our experiments is an
array based CSA multiplier, generated by ABC. Unless stated otherwise, the truncated multipliers in our experiments are obtained by removing 1/4 partial products
and truncating up to half of the output bits (LSBs).
Table 4.2: Results and comparison with Function Extraction [22] using truncated
CSA multipliers.
# bits
6
8
16
32
64
128
256

*TO : Time out of 9,000sec, MO : Memory out of 10GB.
Function Extraction [22]
This Work
Runtime (sec) Memory (MB)
Runtime (sec) Memory (MB)
38.94
296.0
0.01
4.2
1174.4*
MO
0.01
4.8
928.2*
MO
0.05
7.3
796.3*
MO
0.25
17.2
631.4*
MO
1.05
57.3
470.9*
MO
4.40
220.4
286.1*
MO
18.94
880.1

As analyzed in Section 4.3, a direct application of function extraction to a truncated multiplier causes a memory explosion during polynomial rewriting. Table 4.2
makes a comparison between our scheme and the original function extraction [22] in
terms of CPU execution time and memory consumption. Truncated multipliers used
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here are CSA-based multipliers. Function extraction [22] succeed only for truncated
multipliers with the operand size up to 6. For larger operand sizes the system runs out
of memory and results in an incomplete calculation. The runtime numbers labeled
with * indicate the CPU time up to the moment when memory usage exceeds 10GB.
In principle, given enough memory, function extraction might be able to output a correct result. However, such an experiment is not feasible or scalable. Hence, a direct
implementation of function extraction to the truncated multiplier is neither efficient
nor scalable. In contrast, our approach based on functional merging and re-synthesis
is very fast, since we eliminate the incomplete additions in a truncated multiplier.
Table 4.3: Results and comparison with ABC, SMT, and SAT solvers using truncated
Baugh-Wooley multipliers.

# bits
6
8
10
12
16
32
64
128
256

*TO : Time out of 9,000sec, MO : Memory out of 10GB.
cec-ABC Lingeling Boolector
This Work
[50] (sec) [9] (sec) [55] (sec) Runtime (sec) Memory (MB)
0.41
0.30
0.16
0.01
4.6
16.2
5.92
3.49
0.28
15.4
318.1
350.3
261.6
0.50
19.8
TO
TO
8746.4
0.81
24.1
TO
TO
TO
1.12
36.8
TO
TO
TO
3.87
50.9
TO
TO
TO
14.7
268.2
TO
TO
TO
68.2
757.6
TO
TO
TO
279.3*
MO

We also analyzed truncated multipliers designed with Baugh-Wooley scheme with
bit-width varying from 6 to 256 bits. Comparison in Table 4.3 shows that our approach gives a much better performance than ABC and Lingeling SAT solver [9].
ABC runtime exceeds 9,000 seconds in checking equivalence between a 12-bit truncated Baugh-Wooley multiplier and a CSA truncated multiplier generated by ABC.
The SAT solver of ABC [50], Lingeling solver [9], and SMT solver Boolector [55] all
fail for sizes greater than 12 bits for this experiment.
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CHAPTER 5
VERIFICATION OF ARITHMETIC CIRCUITS
SUBJECTED TO ARITHMETIC CONSTRAINTS

Previous chapter described the reconstruction approach to the verification of arithmetic circuits, in which some of the output bits have been truncated. In this chapter,
we will discuss the case when an arithmetic circuit is subjected to arithmetic constraints, applied to its inputs. The concept of vanishing monomial is introduced to
enable algebraic rewriting to verify such constrained circuits. A case-splitting verification approach is proposed. The method has been tested on constrained arithmetic
circuits, such as adders, multipliers and dividers up to 128 bits.

5.1

Problem Statement

Certain applications require arithmetic circuits to be customized by imposing
some constraints to be satisfied by the circuit. When designing such circuits, the
circuit performance or its area can be improved by taking the information of these
constraints into account. For example, such constraints may ensure that operands of
a divider are normalized such that the MSB always has value 1. Similarly, while a
general n × n-bit multiplier has 2n output bits, the output range is not [0, 22n − 1] but
[0, 22n − 2n+1 + 1]. The designer can take this range into consideration when designing
circuits driven by a multiplier. Sometimes the constraints are not directly imposed
on the circuit, but given as preconditions that it should satisfy.
Another practical example can be found in the basic block of a constant divider
[4], shown in Figure 5.1. In each division iteration, the computed remainder R of one
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Figure 5.1: Division operation and the basic divider block.

block is fed into the next block as input C. In such a design, the relationship C < D
should be satisfied, ensuring that the input remainder value C is strictly less than
the divisor value D (a known constant). Verification of such circuit has only recently
caught some attention of the verification community [43].
Computer algebra approaches discussed in Chapter 3, which can successfully verify
large standard arithmetic circuits, seem to be incapable to deal with the verification
of such constrained circuits. The main reason is that the computed input signature
of a circuit subjected to an arithmetic constraint will become too large to compute
or too complex to analyze. In the next section, an example is given to illustrate
the difference between two adder circuits, one being constraint-free and the other
subjected to some arithmetic constraints.

5.2

Constraint-free Circuit vs. Constrained Circuit

Recall that a pseudo-Boolean function f is an n-ary function f : Bn → Z, where B
is a set of Boolean variables, and Z is a set of integers. A pseudo-Boolean constraint
(PB-constraint) can be expressed by an equality or inequality relation between a
pseudo-Boolean function and an integer. In general, such a constraint has the form

X
i

ai ·

Y
j
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lij # c

(5.1)

where the coefficients ai and the constant c are integers, # is one of the relations <
, ≤ , = , 6= , ≥. A literal lij can be either a Boolean variable xij or its negation xij .
Other, more complex constraints, such as max, min, or cardinality constraints, are
not under considered in this work. Since the relations = and 6= can be considered as
a special case of ≥ or ≤, we will focus on the inequality relations ≥ and ≤. In some
cases, Equation 5.1 can be simplified to an arithmetic constraint X ≥ c or X ≤ c,
where X represents a word-level input vector of the circuit, with the operand size n,
so that the constant integer c is in the range of [0, 2n − 1].
The following example, Figure 5.2, shows a standard 3-bit adder Z = A + B, with
the operand A having constraint A ≥ 3 imposed on it. We shall refer to this circuit as
a conditional adder. For ease of comparison between the original, constraint-free and
the constrained circuit, the original circuit in Figure 5.2, with outputs are {z00 , z10 ,
z20 , z30 } is shown in black. For the sake of illustration, the entire circuit with outputs
{z0 , z1 , z2 , z3 } has not been optimized, so that a complete structure of the original
adder can be seen. In general, it is difficult to separate the constraint-free part after
the entire circuit has been synthesized, since the internal structure may change.

Figure 5.2: conditional 3-bit adder Z = A + B, with A ≥ 3.
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Let us start from the unoptimized circuit in Figure 5.2, in which the black part
performs a 3-bit addition, stored in the output bits {z00 , z10 , z20 , z30 }. To get the function
of the entire circuit, we need to explore the relation between F (z00 , z10 , z20 , z30 , d) and
its transformed version, F (z0 , z1 , z2 , z3 ), where d is an internal signal shown in the
figure. Each output zk of the transformed circuit is related to the original output by
Boolean relation zk = zk0 ∨ d for k = 0, 1, 2, 3, where ∨ is the Boolean OR operation.
The following is true in the circuit: when d = 0, then zk = zk0 , and when d = 1,
zk = 1, regardless of the value of zk0 . That is, the function of d decides the condition
of the circuit. By analyzing the schematic in Figure 5.2, we get d = a2 · a0 · a1 =
a2 + a0 · a1 , which is exactly in accord with the required condition, A ≥ 3, imposed
on the circuit. If the condition is not satisfied (that is A < 3), all the output bits will
produce 1, acting like don’t cares. The function table of the conditional 3-bit adder
A + B (A ≥ 3), shown in table 5.1, are consistent with the expected behavior of the
circuit.
Table 5.1: Function table of a conditional 3-bit adder A + B (A ≥ 3).
A(a2 a1 a0 )
000
001
010
011 ... 111

B(b2 b1 b0 )
000 ... 111

d Z(z3 z2 z1 z0 )
1
1111
1
1111
1
1111
0
A+B

The expression d = a2 · a0 · a1 corresponds to the three invalid entries above, that
is, a2 = 0 and a1 ·a0 = 0. In this case, d evaluates to 1, so Z produces all 10 s regardless
of the value of A or B. On the other hand, the expression d = a2 + a0 · a1 corresponds
to the remaining entries, that is, a2 = 1 or a1 · a0 = 1. In this case, d evaluates to 0,
and Z performs the addition between A and B.
The above analysis of the unoptimized circuit in Figure 5.2 shows that it is possible
to verify an arithmetic circuit under arithmetic constraints if the constraint-free part
can be identified. The constraint-free part can be easily verified using algebraic
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rewriting, starting with the output signature 8z30 + 4z20 + 2z10 + z00 . This signature is
rewritten using the equations of the logic components until it reaches the primary
inputs. At this point, the computed input signature 4a2 + 2a1 + a0 + 4b2 + 2b1 + b0 is
the proof that the original (black) portion of the circuit is performing a 3-bit addition.
However in a real optimized design, a separation between the original and the
modified circuit is unlikely. Now, let us assume that the circuit in Figure 5.2 is given
without knowing the boundary between the black (original) and the red (added) portions of the circuit. The task is to explore the function of the entire circuit and to
verify that it is a conditional circuit satisfying the condition A ≥ 3. To do that, we
can apply the standard procedure of algebraic rewriting, and starting with the output
signature 8z3 + 4z2 + 2z1 + z0 rewrite it in a reverse topological order, until reaching
the primary inputs. The resulting polynomial is:

Sig = −12a0 · a1 − 11a2 − 4a0 · a1 · a2 · b2 − 2a0 · a1 · a2 · b1
− a0 · a1 · a2 · b0 + a0 · a1 · b0 + a0 · a2 + a2 · b0 + 2a0 · a1 · b1
+ 2a1 · a2 + 2a2 · b1 + 4a0 · a1 · b2 + 4a2 · b2 + 12a0 · a1 · a2 + 15

from which it is hard to tell what the actual function is.
In order to verify that this is a conditional 3-bit adder A + B, satisfying the constraint A ≥ 3, we can compare the computed signature Sig, although complex, with
the expected signature provided by the designer. However, this is neither practical
nor reliable. For a large circuit, the final signature may contains million of terms,
since it is not a standard circuit with a linear signature anymore. As shown in the Results section, computing the signature for a 32-bit constrained multiplier will quickly
run out of 16 GB memory. Even if the result can be achieved and compared with an
expected signature, the process is not very reliable, as we cannot identify the function
by analyzing such a complex polynomial.
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At this point, the algebraic approach has lost its principle advantage, namely, the
function of the circuit can be easily recognized from the computed signature and the
specification can be written as a polynomial in a simple way. In the next section, the
concept of vanishing monomials will be introduced, which can be used to solve this
problem. We will then propose a case-splitting method to analyze and simplify the
signature to make it work for general case.

5.3

Verifying Constrained Circuit by Case-splitting Analysis
with Vanishing Monomials

5.3.1

Vanishing Monomials

From the analysis presented in the previous section, we conclude that we cannot
obtain signature (4a2 + 2a1 + a0 + 4b2 + 2b1 + b0 ) for the circuit in Figure 5.2 since
the circuit correctly performs addition only under certain condition. We also showed
that the condition is related to the terms a2 and a0 · a1 . Hence, let us try to analyze
the computed signature by partitioning their terms into two groups: the terms with
a2 or a0 · a1 , and the terms without a2 and a0 · a1 . With this we obtain,

Sig = a2 (−11 − 4a0 · a1 · b2 − 2a0 · a1 · b1 − a0 · a1 · b0 + a0 + b0 + 2a1 + 2b1
+ 4b2 + 12a0 · a1 ) + a0 · a1 (−12 + b0 + 2b1 + 4b2 ) + 15

(5.2)

We observe that the constant 15 is the only term that does not contain terms a2
and a0 · a1 . Therefore, if both a2 and a0 · a1 are 0, then Z = 8z3 + 4z2 + 2z1 + z0 = 15.
This means that z3 = z2 = z1 = z0 = 1, since they are Boolean variables. This agrees
with the first three invalid entries of Table 5.1 in the previous section. Therefore, we
can infer that when the circuit is in an invalid state (A < 3), the monomials a2 and
a0 · a1 always evaluate to zero.
In our verification work, the monomials associated with invalid entries, in this case
a2 and a0 · a1 , are defined as vanishing monomials. If the circuit is subjected to
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certain arithmetic constraints, those conditions will appear as vanishing monomials
in the final signature. The vanishing monomials help us simplify and analyze the
signature generated in the verification process.
Going back to our analysis, when a2 and a0 ·a1 vanish (evaluate to 0), the first three
entries of each table in Figure 5.3 are selected, as shown in Figure 5.3(a), denoted
Case1. In this case, all the output bits {z0 , z1 , z2 , z3 } produce 1, indicating the don’t
care status. The opposite case is to select the remaining entries, as shown in Figure
5.3(b), Case2. This case can be further split into two cases: (1) Case3 in Figure 5.3(c);
and (2) {Case4 in Figure 5.3(d) or Case5 in Figure 5.3(e)}. In theory, choosing Case4
or Case5 gives the same result, as they cover all the possible assignments. We will
show, however, that choosing Case5 is more efficient.

Figure 5.3: Different cases of entry selection.

To select the four entries in Figure 5.3(c), we set a2 = 1. With this, the signature
in Equation 5.2 becomes Sig = a0 + b0 + 2a1 + 2b1 + 4 + 4b2 . At the same time,
the specification of the 3-bit adder Fspec = a0 + b0 + 2a1 + 2b1 + 4a2 + 4b2 becomes
a0 + b0 + 2a1 + 2b1 + 4 + 4b2 . Therefore, Sig = Fspec , proving that when a2 = 1, the
circuit performs a 3-bit addition.
Similarly, to select the entry in Figure 5.3(e), we apply a2 = 0 and a0 · a1 = 1
to both Sig and Fspec . Notice that, since a0 and a1 are Boolean, a0 · a1 = 1 implies
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a0 = a1 = 1. In this case, Sig = Fspec = b0 + 2b1 + 3 + 4b2 , proving that the circuit
performs 3-bit addition when selecting Case5. Finally, since all the entries, either
valid or invalid, are covered, we can conclude that the circuit is indeed a 3-bit adder
Z = A + B, under the condition A ≥ 3.

5.3.2

Case-splitting Verification Approach

In this section, we provide another example to further explain the proposed casesplitting approach. In the previous sections, we discussed the scenario when constraint
X ≥ c is applied to the circuit. The following example in Figure 5.4 illustrates a
conditional 3-bit adder with a constraint A < 3, opposite to the one in Figure 5.2.

Figure 5.4: 3-bit adder Z = A + B, for A < 3.

In this example, the circuit in Figure 5.4 has been optimized. For a large design, it is unlikely to separate the constraint-free part from the entire circuit after
optimization. Since the condition of this circuit is the complement of the previous
one (A ≥ 3), all the previous invalid states (the first three entries of Table 5.1) now
become the valid states, and all the previous valid states become invalid.
After rewriting, the circuit’s signature is shown in Eqn.(5.3) below.
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Sig = a2 (−12a0 · a1 − 4b2 − 2a1 − 2b1 − a0 − b0 + a0 · a1 · b0 + 2a0 · a1 · b1 + 4a0 · a1 · b2
+ 15) + a0 · a1 (−4b2 − 2b1 − b0 + 12) + (a0 + b0 + 2a1 + 2b1 + 4b2 )

(5.3)

It is obvioulsy different than Eqn.(5.2), since it represents a different circuit. However,
since the boundary between the valid and invalid states in the truth table is the same,
the vanishing monomials are still a2 and a0 ·a1 . Also, because the vanishing monomials
are the same, the case-splitting analysis of Sig is the same, composed of three cases:
Case1, Case3, and Case5 in Figure 5.3.
To select Case1, Figure 5.3(a), we apply a2 = 0 and a0 · a1 = 0 to both Sig and
the expected Fspec of the adder, and the two turn out to be equivalent. In this case,
terms a2 and a0 ·a1 always evaluate to zero in the functionally correct implementation.
However, we cannot just assume that the circuit is correct; considering the valid
entries only is not sufficient since it does not cover all the possible assignments.
Therefore, we also need to select Case2 in Figure 5.3(b) in order to identify the
invalid entries.
Similarly, Case2 be further split into two cases, Case3 in Figure 5.3(c) and Case5
in Figure 5.3(e). After applying a2 = 1 or {a2 = 0, a0 · a1 = 1} to Sig, we obtain
Sig = 15, which agrees with the expected signature for invalid states. This is because
only when z3 = z2 = z1 = z0 = 1, do we have Z = 8z3 + 4z2 + 2z1 + z0 = 15.
Therefore, by case-splitting, we prove that the circuit in Figure 5.4 is a 3-bit adder
Z = A + B, under the condition A < 3. As we can see, the case-splitting strategy
for the verification of the two conditional adders (with A ≥ 3 and A < 3) is the
same, even though they have different signatures. Consequently, we can infer that
the vanishing monomials are related to the constant c in the constraint X ≥ c or
X < c. The method to systematically generate the vanishing monomials will be
discussed in the next section.
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The process of setting the vanishing monomials to either 0 or 1 is called valuation of
vanishing monomials. The valuation of vanishing monomials help us choose between
different cases. For efficiency reason, the valuation is not performed only after the
final signature is computed. Instead, the valuation is applied during rewriting, once
a term that contains one of the vanishing monomials is detected; in this case the
term is simplified according to the pre-selected case. In this way, the redundant
terms are eliminated as soon as possible in an attempt to avoid the intermediate
polynomials growing dramatically. In the Result Section 5.4, a significant difference
in the result between valuation and without valuation will be demonstrated. This
is also the reason why we choose Case5 instead of Case4, since it provides a greater
degree of simplification.
In summary, to verify a circuit subjected to an arithmetic constraint, we first
generate the vanishing monomials using the knowledge of the given constraint. Then,
a case-splitting approach is applied according to the generated vanishing monomials.
The union of all cases will cover all possible input assignments. Each case requires
an individual rewriting with different valuation of vanishing monomials. The circuit
is correct, if the computed signature is equal to the specification in each case.
Specifically, there are two lists: 0-set and 1-set, each initialized to be empty. For
each case, one of the vanishing monomials will be moved into the 1-set, so that it will
be evaluated to 1 during the rewriting. After the current case is checked (Sig = Fspec ),
the corresponding vanishing monomial is moved from the 1-set to the 0-set, so that
it will be evaluated to 0 in the next case. We repeat this procedure until the 0-set
contains all the vanishing monomials, suggesting that they all have been successively
evaluated to 1. The last case is to check when all the vanishing monomials vanish
(evaluate to 0). If the relationship Sig = Fspec is satisfied for all the cases, we conclude
that the circuit is correct. The order in which the vanishing monomials are evaluated
can be random, but a decreasing order (from MSB to LSB) is recommended for the
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efficiency purpose. In the next section, we will discuss how to generate vanishing
monomials and analyze the complexity for the case-splitting approach.

5.3.3

Generation of Vanishing Monomials

As explained in the previous sections, vanishing monomials play an important role
in our verification approach. They are associated with invalid entries and reflect the
arithmetic constraints in the final signature. In this section, we explain the reason for
the appearance of vanishing monomials and describe the method for their detection.
In the following theorem we refer to a truth table as the way to describe the function.
Theorem: The input signature Sigin of the circuit contains vanishing monomials
associated with the dc-set of the truth table, regardless whether these don’t-care entries
are used during synthesis or not.
Proof. Let F be a single output bit of an arithmetic function, corresponding to one of
the output columns of the truth table. According to the standard design procedure, it
can be implemented as a disjunction (OR) of product terms. Since product term is a
conjunction (AND) of literals of individual variables, it is represented in an algebraic
form also as a product of the corresponding variables in respective polarities. This is
also true for products that include complemented variables, e.g., a ∧ ¬b = a · (1 − b) =
a − a · b. Hence, any product from the valid entries of the truth table may contain
vanishing monomials. The same argument applies to the case when input variables
appear in different product terms; a disjunction of those terms will also create a
product of the respective literals, according to the equation: a ∨ b = a + b − a · b, where
a, b can be any product term. As a result, the signature expression generated during
rewriting may contain product of variables that correspond to vanishing monomials.

Our previous work [4] described an approach to generate vanishing monomials for
constant dividers by computing algebraic expressions for the invalid entries. However,
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such a method is inefficient, since applying algebraic rewriting to a single output bit
misses the chance for polynomial cancellations. This causes an exponential increase
in the size of intermediate polynomials, resulting in a memory problem. For the case
of contiguous entries (block of entries with the same value of F ) in the truth table, we
come up with a solution without performing rewriting. For the case of non-contiguous
entries, we might still rely the rewriting.
Based on the discussion in the previous section, we observe that the constraint
X ≥ c or X < c have the same vanishing monomials. Thus, we can infer that the
vanishing monomials are related to the constant c in the constraint. The following
examples illustrate the process of generating vanishing monomials.
Example1: Let an 8-bit operand A ≥ 201. We first convert the decimal number
201 into binary 11001001, then fill its truth table, shown in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Truth table for function F : A ≥ 201, where A is an 8-bit operand.
The symbol ”-” represents ”don’t care”

A(a7 a6 a5 a4 a3 a2 a1 a0 )
00000000
..
.
11001000
11001001
1100101 110011 - 1101 - - - 111 - - - - -

F
0
1
1
1
1
1

According to the entry selection discussed in the previous section, if we want to
select the last row the table, we set a7 · a6 · a5 = 1. Then, a7 · a6 · a5 = 0 represents the
rest of the rows. According to this, in order to select the second row from the bottom,
we can first set a7 · a6 · a5 = 0, then a7 · a6 · a4 = 1. Since the expression a7 · a6 · a5 = 0
implies that a7 or a6 or a5 is 0, and a7 · a6 · a4 = 1 implies a7 = a6 = a4 = 1, the
combination of these two steps imply a7 = a6 = a4 = 1 and a5 = 0, allowing us to
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select the second row from the bottom. Similarly, to select the third row, we can set
both a7 · a6 · a5 and a7 · a6 · a4 to 0 and a7 · a6 · a3 · a2 to 1.
Such a procedure is consistent with the 0-set and 1-set in the case-splitting strategy, discussed in the previous section. Therefore, we can infer that the monomials
a7 · a6 · a5 , a7 · a6 · a4 and a7 · a6 · a3 · a2 are actually vanishing monomials. They simply
agree with the index of 10 s in each row. After collecting all the vanishing monomials and performing factorization, we realize that we can directly get the expression
of vanishing monomials from the binary number 11001001 = (20110 ). The following
algorithm explains the procedure.
Scanning the binary string from the MSB to the LSB, we replace each binary
number 1 by a string ”ai · (” and replace 0 by ”ai +”. The character ”)” is then added
in the end. Thus, according to this procedure, 11001001 is replaced by:

a7 · (a6 · (a5 + a4 + a3 · (a2 + a1 + a0 · 1)))
= a7 · a6 · (a5 + a4 + a3 · (a2 + a1 + a0 ))

(5.4)

= a7 · a6 · a5 + a7 · a6 · a4 + a7 · a6 · a3 · a2 + a7 · a6 · a3 · a1 + a7 · a6 · a3 · a0

The vanishing monomials are clearly identified, since they are separated by a plus
sign +. When all the vanishing monomials evaluate to 0 (are added into the 0-set),
the first row for F = 0 in Table 5.2 is selected.
Example2: Let A < 108, where A is an 8-bit operand. As before, we first convert
the decimal number 108 into binary 01101100, and fill its truth table, Table 5.3.
In the same way, starting from the MSB to the LSB of binary number 01101100
(10810 ), we replace each 1 by a string ”ai · (” and replace 0 by ”ai +”. The character
”)” is finally added. According to this procedure, 01101100 is replaced by:
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Table 5.3: Truth table of F :A < 108, where A is an 8-bit operand.
The symbol ”-” represents ”don’t care”

A(a7 a6 a5 a4 a3 a2 a1 a0 )
00000000
..
.
01101011
01101100
01101101
0110111 0111 - - - 1-------

F
1

0
0
0

a7 + a6 · (a5 · (a4 + a3 · (a2 · (a1 + a0 + 1)))) = a7 + a6 · a5 · (a4 + a3 · a2 )
= a7 + a6 · a5 · a4 + a6 · a5 · a3 · a2

(5.5)

Therefore, there are three vanishing monomials a7 , a6 ·a5 ·a4 , and a6 ·a5 ·a3 ·a2 . When
these monomials all evaluate to 0, the first row for F = 1 in Table 5.3 is selected.

5.3.4

Complexity Analysis

The complexity of the case-splitting approach is related to the number of vanishing monomials. For m vanishing monomials, there are m + 1 cases to be checked.
Specifically, each of the vanishing monomials is evaluated to 1, consecutively for each
case. The last case is to put all the vanishing monomials into the 0-set to select the
upper entries. Checking each case requires one run of the rewriting. Thus, there will
be m + 1 times of algebraic rewriting needed with different valuation of vanishing
monomials. However, all the cases can be evaluated in parallel, since the value of
vanishing monomials in each case is known ahead of time. The total time is then
dictated by the slowest case. Since each case performs the same rewriting steps (gate
polynomials are the same), their performance would not vary much.
We now discuss the relationship between the size of the operand n (number of
bits of the constant) and the number of vanishing monomials m. For the contiguous
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entries (block of entries with the same value of F ) in the table, the best case is m = 1,
regardless of the value of n. This case occurs when valid entries and invalid entries
cut the overall space in half-and-half, with the MSB being 0 or 1. As the boundary
between the valid and invalid entries moves up or down, the value of m changes.
According to this, the worst case is when there is only one valid entry, for example,
when the constraint is A > 0, in which case m = n.
In the previous 3-bit adder example, the simulation would need 26 = 64 test
vectors to cover all possible assignments. In contrast, the case-splitting method has
only two vanishing monomials, thus checking only three cases will cover all the possible
assignments. In general, for a two n-bit operand circuit, simulation requires 22n test
vectors, while the proposed case-splitting method has n + 1 cases to check, in the
worst case. For both operands having constraints, there are n2 cases to check in the
worst case.

5.4

Results and Conclusion

The case-splitting approach and the modified algebraic rewriting technique have
been implemented as a program in C++. The experiments were performed on an
Intel Core CPU i5-3470, 3.20 GHz with 15.6 GB memory. The proposed method has
been tested on the constrained arithmetic circuits: adders, multipliers and dividers,
up to 128 bits. Standard arithmetic circuits are generated by the ABC tool [50].
The arithmetic constraints were manually imposed on the circuits and the circuit was
resynthesized.
Table 5.4 shows the verification time of different approaches, namely SAT (Lingeling [9]), original algebraic rewriting [86], and the proposed case-splitting method.
It turns out that building a miter between two circuits and trying to solve the SAT
problem is not efficient as it requires bit-blasting, i.e. representing the circuit as a
bit-level netlist. This approach could not verify constrained circuits beyond 16-bit
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Table 5.4: Verification time of different approaches.
*T.O : Time out of 3,600 sec, M.O : Memory out of 10GB.
Verification time for
Verification time for
constrained adders (sec)
constrained multiplers (sec)
Operand
SAT [9]
Algebraic
This
SAT [9]
Algebraic
This
size
(Lingeling) rewriting [86] work (Lingeling) rewriting [86] work
8
1.01
0.01
0.01
3.54
0.03
0.01
16
123.2
6.10
0.01
T.O
8.24
0.02
32
T.O
823.4
0.03
T.O
M.O
0.13
64
T.O
M.O
0.09
T.O
M.O
2.10
128
T.O
M.O
0.72
T.O
M.O
9.94
operands. It should be noted that the case-splitting analysis can also be handled by
SAT solvers, since the valuation of VMs can be achieved by simply adding clauses to a
SAT formula. One observation is that, for the cases of invalid input assignment, SAT
solver is more efficient than rewriting and quickly gives an unSAT answer, suggesting
that the circuits are functionally equivalent. This is because, for invalid assignment,
the conditional circuit outputs all ’1’, bypassing the major logic. However, for the
valid cases, where the circuit is actually performing the required arithmetic operation, the SAT solver needs to examine a larger search space and is much slower than
rewriting. In summary, SAT does not offer much benefit in case-splitting approach
and shows a low scalability.
Direct application of algebraic rewriting to the constrained circuits is also not
feasible. As discussed in Section 5.3.2, the unresolved vanishing monomials will cause
the memory issue. In general, the constrained circuit has the form F 0 = F ∨ d, where
F represents the constraint-free part that can be quickly verified alone, and d is
the constraint condition which can be represented by the vanishing monomials. The
expression for the constrained circuit F 0 = F ∨ d can be given in an algebraic form as
F + d − F · d, where F represents the output signature of the constraint-free circuit,
and polynomial d represents the imposed constraints condition. The rewriting of F
is fast as explained in Chapter 3. However, the size of intermediate polynomial d and
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F · d grows exponentially without polynomial simplification during the rewriting. As
we can see in the table, calculating the signature for the constrained circuits beyond
32-bit use all the 10 GB memory (but still inconclusive).
In this work, we modify the algebraic rewriting technique to handle constraints
by valuation of vanishing monomials. During the rewriting process, once we detect a
term that contains one of the vanishing monomials, we simplify this term by valuation
of VMs according to the pre-selected case. By doing this, we resolve the expression of
d as soon as possible to avoid the size of intermediate signature becoming too large.
Hence, each rewriting does not suffer from memory issue. This is the reason that
the proposed method is fast and scalable, as shown in Table 5.4. The verification
time reported in the table is the time to verify a single case. However, as explained
earlier, since all of the cases can be checked in parallel, the total time is dictated by
the slowest case. Moreover, since each case performs the same rewriting steps with
different valuation of vanishing monomials, the performance does not vary much.
One might argue that if the applied constraint is changed, the verification time in
Table 5.4 may change dramatically. To verify this opinion, we performed an experiment with a 64-bit multiplier to test if different constraints (with a different number of
vanishing monomials) affect the verification time and to what extent. Different constraints were applied to the multiplier to affect the number of vanishing monomials.
The results of this experiment are shown in Table 5.5.
Table 5.5: Verification time of a 64-bit multiplier (A × B) with different constraints.
Arithmetic constraint
# Vanishing monomials Verification time (sec)
A ≥ 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
1
2.01
A < 0x7FFF7FFFFFFBFFDF
4
1.99
A ≥ 0xF0FFFFFF9FFFFFF3
8
2.03
A < 0xFFF0FFF0FF0FF0FF
16
2.11
A ≥ 0x00F90F0FF00F73F1
32
2.52
A > 0x0000000000000000
64
2.50
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One observation from the table is that, as the number of vanishing monomials
increases, the verification time does not increase much. This is because, when valuating the vanishing monomials, we avoid the increase in memory by resolving the
algebraic expressions of d before they grow too much. Thus, an increase in the number of vanishing monomials would not cause memory problem, despite the fact that
the increase in the number of vanishing monomials requires more cases to be checked.
This is not a problem, however, since all the cases can be checked in a parallel. The
only thing that would be affected is the search space in each step of the rewriting.
During the rewriting, we need to check if a new term contains one of the vanishing
monomials. Therefore, increasing the number of vanishing monomials require only a
little more time for each substitution. Since this will not cause the memory overload
issue, it has low net impact on the verification time.
The proposed case-splitting method has been also tested on a number of 32-bit
constant dividers for different divisor values. The basic block of a constant divider is
shown in Figure 5.5. Each block is subjected to a constraint C < D, where C is the
input remainder, and D is the divisor value. We compared our method against an
exhaustive simulation, the result of which is shown in Figure 5.6 and Table 5.6. Figure
5.6 shows the simulation results for D = 257 and 283 for the following three cases: 1)
LUT-based implementation generated by FloPoCo [27]; 2) Gate-level implementation
synthesized with ABC; and 3) A restoring constant divider implemented with ABC.

Figure 5.5: Division operation and the basic divider block.
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a Divisor = 257

b Divisor = 283

Figure 5.6: Exhaustive simulation run time for divisors D=257 and D=283 for different
implementations, as a function of the dividend bit-width.

The results show that the simulation approach is competitive for dividend bit-widths
up to 22 bits, but for higher bit-widths simulation becomes prohibitive. For example,
the simulation for dividends larger than 28 bits required 15, 264 seconds (4h 24m),
with memory-out at 24 GB for larger bit-widths.
Table 5.6: Verification results for the divide-by-constant divider circuit with a 32-bit
dividend X using the proposed technique for Modular 1-bit block.
Divisor
3
11
31
89
139
257
283

# Rem. bit
2
4
5
7
8
9
9

Runtime w/o bug (sec)
0.06
1.15
0.31
13.5
27.9
22.56
643.8

# Bugs
1
2
5
5
7
7
9

Runtime w bugs (sec)
0.06
1.11
0.27
16.7
64.75
23.0
638.4

In the modular architecture, the boundary between adjacent blocks is known
and the vanishing monomials are extracted and removed from the signature at each
block, before rewriting the next block in series. The experiments in Table 5.6 include
both correct (bug-free) and faulty circuits. The faults were emulated by randomly
injecting multiple faults in the truth table into the valid portion of the look-up table.
The result shows that this method can verify a 32-bit constant divider (one-bit block
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architecture) for the divisor value up to 283. However, verifying non-modular divider
architecture and a generic divider remains a challenging problem. The difficulty of
verifying such dividers does not lie in the proposed case-splitting method, but in the
divider itself (verifying constraint-free divider is hard). This problem requires more
work and is a subject of a future research [5].
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CHAPTER 6
VERIFICATION AND DEBUGGING OF GALOIS FIELD
MULTIPLIERS

In this chapter, we present a novel method to verify and debug gate-level arithmetic circuits implemented in Galois Field arithmetic. The method is based on the
computer algebra approach, similar to the one discussed in Chapter 3. However,
instead of an algebraic backward rewriting, a forward reduction of the specification
polynomials is applied to the circuit in GF (2m ), using GF (2) models of logic gates.
To achieve this, we define a forward term order ”F O >” and the rules of forward reduction that enable verification, bug detection, and automatic bug correction in the
circuit. By analyzing the remainder generated by the forward reduction, the method
can determine whether the circuit is buggy, and finds the location and the type of
the bug. The experiments performed on Mastrovito and Montgomery multipliers
show that our debugging method is independent of the location of the bug(s) and the
debugging time is comparable to the time needed to verify the bug-free circuit.

6.1

Background

6.1.1

Galois Fields

A finite field or Galois field (GF) is a field that contains a finite number of elements. There are two main arithmetic operations in GF, addition and multiplication;
other operations such as division can be derived from those two [57]. Galois field with
p elements is denoted as GF(p). GF(p) is a prime field if it is consisted of a finite
number of integers {1, 2, ...., p − 1}, where p is a prime number, with additions and
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multiplication performed modulo p. Of particular interest are binary extension fields,
denoted GF(2m ) (or F2m ), which are finite fields with 2m elements. The field of size
m is constructed using irreducible polynomial P (x), which includes terms of degree
with d ∈ [0, m] with coefficients in GF(2). Arithmetic operations in the field are then
performed modulo P(x). GF arithmetic is used in hardware design for many cryptography applications, such as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and Elliptic-curve
cryptography (ECC).

6.1.2

Computer Algebra Approach in GF

Algebraic approach to circuit verification used in this chapter relies on polynomial
representation of the circuit specification and its logic gate components, discussed in
Chapter 3. We recall here definitions of two signatures that play a major role in
our algebraic-based verification. Input Signature, denoted Sigin , is the polynomial
in terms of the PI variables that represents the expected function of the circuit.
Output Signature, denoted Sigout , is a polynomial expressed in the PO variables
that represents a binary encoding of the output. As defined in Chapter 3, algebraic
backward rewriting is the process that transforms the output signature Sigout into a
unique input signature Sigin using algebraic (polynomial) models of the logic gates
of the circuit [22][87]. As discussed later in this chapter, the rewriting can also be
done in the opposite direction (from PI to PO), referred to as forward rewriting.
This work models Boolean operators using algebraic models of GF (2). For example, the pseudo-Boolean model of XOR in integer arithmetic, XOR(a, b)=a + b −2ab,
is reduced in GF(2) to (a + b + 2ab) mod 2 = (a + b) mod 2. The following algebraic
models are used to describe basic logic gates in GF (2m ) [46][87]:
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¬a = 1 + a mod 2
a ∧ b = a · b mod 2

(6.1)

a ∨ b = a + b + a · b mod 2
a ⊕ b = a + b mod 2
To address the debugging problem of gate-level GF circuits we define two orders
by which monomials are listed in each polynomial:
Definition 1: BO > order: A backward, reverse-topological order, such that every
output signal of a gate is always greater than its input signal. The set of polynomials
representing a logic cone ordered according to BO > is called a BO base.
Definition 2: F O > order: A forward, topological order, such that every output
signal of a gate is always less than its input signal. The set of polynomials ordered
according to F O > is called an F O base.
For example, the polynomials for an OR gate z in these orders are:
BO > order: z + a + b + a · b,
F O > order: a + b + a · b + z.
The BO > order has been used successfully in verification works of [63][86][87], but,
as demonstrated in this paper, it is ineffective in debugging of GF circuits. The
approach described in this paper is based on an F O > order.

6.1.3

GF Multiplier Principles

Galois Field multiplication is performed modulo an irreducible polynomial P (x),
a polynomial that cannot be factored into nontrivial polynomials over the given field
[57][53]. The inputs and outputs of GF(2k ) multiplication are k-bit binary numbers. An example of a 4-bit GF(24 ) multiplication, with irreducible polynomial
P (x)=x4 +x3 +1, is shown in Figure 6.1.
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a3 b 3
s6
s3
s4
s5
s6
z3

s2
0
0
s6
z2

s1
0
s5
s6
z1

a3 b 1
a2 b 2
a1 b 3
s4

a3
b3
a3 b 0
a2 b 1
a1 b 2
a0 b 3
s3

a2
b2
a2 b0
a1 b1
a0 b2

a1
b1
a1 b 0
a0 b 1

a0
b0
a0 b 0

a3 b 2
a2 b 3
s5
s2
s1
s0
L
sq =
ai bj , ∀ i+j=q, 0 ≤ q ≤ 6

s0
s4
s5
s6
z0

z0
z1
z2
z3

=
=
=
=

s0
s1
s2
s3

⊕
⊕
⊕
⊕

s4 ⊕ s5 ⊕ s6
s5 ⊕ s6
s6
s4 ⊕ s5 ⊕ s6

Figure 6.1: Multiplication in GF(24 ): Z mod P (x) = A · B mod P (x), where
P (x)=x4 +x3 +1.

The GF multiplication is performed in a straightforward way by: 1) generating
and adding the partial products; and 2) reducing the result over GF(2m ) with P (x).
The partial products are generated in the same way as in the integer multiplication,
using AND operations. However the sum of the partial products (denoted sq in
Figure 6.1) is obtained using a series of XORs, since additions in finite field are
implemented as XOR operations. This multiplication structure is called Mastrovito
multiplier [76]. Note that in GF arithmetic there is no carry propagation between the
columns of the result bits. Hence, each bit can be computed separately as a linear
(XOR) sum of the product terms in the respective column. An alternative method
for performing fast modular multiplication is the Montgomery multiplication [51]. It
works by transforming two integer inputs, A, B, into Montgomery forms, AR mod N
and BR mod N , for some constant R, and computing the product ABR mod N .
The multiplication result A · B is then obtained by transforming the result from
the Montgomery form, as A · B = A · B · R−1 mod P (x). Since the Montgomery form
generator is a GF multiplication with a constant input R, each of the four components
can be considered as a simplified Mastrovito multiplication [42].

83

6.2

Bug Identification

This section describes an algorithm that utilizes the property of GF multipliers to
identify bug(s) in the circuit. It consists of two major parts: 1) Remainder Generation
and 2) Bug Analysis.
Algorithm 4 Remainder Generation via Forward Rewriting
Input: Gate-level netlist of the GF circuit
Input: Expected InputSignaturei of each output bit
Output: Residual polynomials {Remainderi }
Output: Non-zero elements of F Oi base
1: PO={z0 , z1 , ..., zn−1 }: primary output bits of the GF circuit
2: for i ← 0 to n − 1 do
3:
Extract cone P Oi from the gate-level netlist and generate the F Oi base
4:
Speci ← InputSignatruei − zi
5:
while Speci 6= 0 do
6:
Successin ← 0
7:
for each polynomial Pj in F Oi base do
8:
for each monomial Mk in Pi do
9:
if Mk divides Speci and Deg(Mk ) == Deg(Speci ) and Mk is not
the last monomial in Pj then
10:
Reduce Speci by Pj ; Set Pj in F Oi to 0; Successin ← 1
11:
end if
12:
end for
13:
end for
14:
if Successin == 0 then
15:
Move the leading term of Speci into Remainderi
16:
end if
17:
end while
18: end for
19: return {Remainderi , non-empty F Oi base}

Algorithm 4 describes forward rewriting; it imposes the F O > order on the polynomials and reduces the specification by the F O base. Each polynomial representing
a logic gate in the F O base has the form: {head}, zi . The {head} is the set of head
monomials representing the gate inputs; the tail monomial zi is the output of the
gate. The degree of the monomial is the sum of the degrees of all its variables. For
example, polynomial of an XOR gate is a + b + zi , where the head set is {a, b}, each
of degree one, and the tail is zi .
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Let the specification of the circuit be defined as Sigin − Sigout , the difference
between the correct (expected) world-level input signature Sigin and the output signature Sigout , which is the binary encoded outputs. Since in a GF circuit the output
bits are independent from each other, we can define Speci , the bit-level logic of output zi , as Sigin (i) − zi . The input signature Sigin (i) is known, computed using the
irreducible polynomial P (x). The verification goal is then to reduce each specification
Speci by its F Oi base. If the result is 0, we conclude that the logic cone associated
with bit i is bug-free. Otherwise, a non-zero Remainderi will indicate the presence
of a bug (or bugs) in that cone.
The first step of Algorithm 4 is to extract all the cones from the circuit and
derive the corresponding Speci (lines 3-6). Recall that the F Oi base is the set of
polynomials with an F O > order describing the input-output relationship for cone i.
While creating logic cones for each output, the common logic is duplicated, effectively
making each cone f anout-f ree1 . This means that every intermediate signal will
appear only once in the head monomials of F Oi base.
The next step is to reduce each Speci by its corresponding F Oi base. In lines
8-10, the Algorithm scans the polynomials in the F Oi base to check if the leading
term lti of Speci is divisible by any of the head monomials with the same degree as
lti . This reduction is different than in the polynomial reduction based on the BO >
order, where only a leading monomial is used in the division process. Allowing the
use of any of the head monomials is essential in identifying the bugs.
As an example, consider the reduction of Speci = a + b + R, where R is the
remaining set of monomials, by polynomial f = a + b + z. The result of such a
reduction should be Speci = z + R. However, if the monomial a is missing in Speci
1

This is true for most structures such as Mastrovito multipliers, but may not be true for more
complex ones, such as Montgomery; we currently limit our attention to those structures that can be
made reconvergent fanout free
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due to a bug (when the gate with output a is false), i.e., when Speci = b+R, the head
monomial b in f still can be used to divide Speci . The result of such a reduction will
be Speci = a + z + R . The monomial a in the reduced Speci will never be eliminated
by other polynomials in F Oi base, since there would be no other gate with signal a
as input. When examining the content of the final remainder, it will be clear that
the gate with output a is the source of the bug.
In summary, if there is a polynomial Pi in F Oi base that contains a head monomial
that divides Speci , it will be used to reduce Speci . The polynomial Pi will then be
removed from the base (each base polynomial can only be used once during the
reduction). However, if the leading term of Speci is not divisible by any of the head
monomials in the F Oi base, it will be moved into Remainderi . This process will
be repeated until Speci becomes empty (lines 13-18); or until it cannot be reduced
anymore, in which case the content of the Remainder will be used to identify the bug.

a

c

a

c

c
b

r
b

c

Figure 6.2: A two-bit Mastrovito GF multiplier.

Example 1: Consider a bug-free two-bit Mastrovito multiplier in Figure 6.2. The
circuit can be separated into two cones: z0 and z1 . The F O1 base of cone z1 includes
polynomials: p1 = a0 b1 + c1 ; p2 = a1 b0 + c2 ; p3 = a1 b1 + c3 ; p4 = c1 + c2 + r0 and
p5 = c3 + r0 + z1 , each written in F O > order. According to the definition, Spec1 is
equal to the input signature of z1 minus z1 , the output signature. The expected input
signature of the circuit is F = (a0 +Xa1 )·(b0 +Xb1 ) = a0 b0 +X(a0 b1 +a1 b0 )+X 2 a1 b1 .
After GF (2) reduction with the irreducible polynomial P (X) = X 2 +X +1, we obtain
F = X(a0 b1 + a1 b0 + a1 b1 ) + (a0 b0 + a1 b1 ). Hence, for output z1 , associated with X,
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we have Spec1 = (a0 b1 + a1 b0 + a1 b1 ) + z1 (mod 2). Similar expression can be derived
for Spec0 of output z0 .
The next step is to reduce the specification Spec1 by the polynomial base of F O1 .
This process is shown in Figure 6.3. We can see that Spec1 is eventually reduced
to 0. That is, Remainder1 = 0 and all polynomials in F O1 have been used, which
indicates that cone z1 is bug-free. We proceed similarly with bit z0 to determine that
its logic cone is also bug-free.
Example 2: Let us now consider the case when there is a bug in the two-bit
multiplier in Figure 6.2. Let the bug be caused by replacing the XOR gate r0 with an
AND gate in cone z1 . That is, polynomial p4 = c1 +c2 +r0 is replaced by p4 = c1 c2 +r0
in the F O1 base, while Spec1 remains the same.
The process of reducing Spec1 by the new F O1 base is shown in Figure 6.3. Note
that in the 4th iteration of the reduction, the polynomial c1 + c2 in Spec1 is not
divisible by any of the head monomials in F O1 , so it will be moved into Remainder1 .
The monomial r0 in the 5th iteration also be moved to Remainder1 .
Polynomials in F O1 base
of a bug-free cone
Spec1 =a0 b1 +a1 b0 +a1 b1 +z1
p1 =a0 b1 +c1
Spec1 /p1 =c1 +a1 b0 +a1 b1 +z1
p2 =a1 b0 +c2
Spec1 /p2 =c1 +c2 +a1 b1 +z1
Spec1 /p3 =c1 +c2 +c3 +z1
p3 =a1 b1 +c3
p4 =c1 +c2 +r0
Spec1 /p4 =2c2 +c3 +r0 +z1 mod 2
p5 =c3 +r0 +z1
Spec1 /p5 =2r0 +2z1 = 0 mod 2
Polynomials in F O1 base
of a buggy cone
Spec1 =a0 b1 +a1 b0 +a1 b1 +z1
p1 =a0 b1 +c1
Spec1 /p1 =c1 +a1 b0 +a1 b1 +z1
p2 =a1 b0 +c2
Spec1 /p2 =c1 +c2 +a1 b1 +z1
p3 =a1 b1 +c3
Spec1 /p3 =c1 +c2 +c3 +z1
p4 =c1 c2 +r0
Spec1 /F O1 =c1 +c2 +c3 +z1
p5 =c3 +r0 +z1
Spec1 /p5 =c1 +c2 +r0 +2z1 mod 2
Figure 6.3: Generating Remainder with Forward Rewriting of bug-free and buggy
logic cone of output bit z1 . Remainder = 0 for bug-free cone, and Remainder =
c1 + c2 + r0 for a buggy cone.
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As a result, we obtain a non-zero Remainder1 = c1 + c2 + r0 , and a non-empty
F O1 base: p4 = c1 c2 + r0 . This is a clear manifestation of a bug; namely, the XOR
gate (c1 + c2 + r0 ) has been replaced by an AND gate (c1 c2 + r0 ), while during the
reduction, polynomial c1 + c2 should have been canceled by r0 . In a similar fashion
we can identify other types of errors caused by gate replacement.
Table 6.1: Bug Analysis
Bug Type
1
2
3
4
5
6

Correct gate
XOR
XOR
AND
AND
OR
OR

False gate Remainder Non-empty base
AND
a+b+z
a·b+z
OR
a·b
XOR
a·b+z
a+b+z
OR
a+b
XOR
a·b
AND
a+b
-

Table 6.1 shows some common cases of erroneous gate-replacement in GF circuit
for 2-input logic gates: AND, OR, and XOR. Similar relations can be derived for
other gates as needed. In the table, signals a and b represent the inputs, and z is the
output of the false gate. By analyzing the Remainderi and the non-empty F Oi base
generated by the algorithm, we can readily determine the type of the error and locate
the bug. This is possible because the remainder contains the names of the input and
output signals of the false gate.
The bug of type 2, 4, 5, 6 are all associated with the OR gate. Since the polynomial
of the OR gate is f = a + b + ab + z, the Spec polynomial can be reduced by f ,
regardless whether the inputs are in the sum form (a + b) or the product form (a·b).
This means that the forward reduction will always ”go through” the bug, and leave
the residual polynomial with their inputs (a + b or a · b) in the remainder. As a
result, they do not have non-empty base and the Remainder contains only the input
variables of the false gate, making it easy to identify the bug. On the other hand,
for bug types 1 and 3, both the input signals (a, b) and the output signal (z) of the
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false gate appear in the Remainder. Furthermore, a non-empty base indicates that
the polynomial propagating through the circuit during forward rewriting cannot ”go
through” the bug. As we can see in the next section, multiple of these bugs will affect
each other.
At this point the reader should fully appreciate the difference between forward
rewriting (using F O > order) and backward rewriting (using BO > order). For a
bug-free circuit both approaches will produce a zero remainder, indicating that the
circuit implements the correct function. However, for the buggy circuit the remainders
will be different. By construction, under the BO > order, the remainder will contain
only the primary inputs, but not the input and output signals of the false gates. This
does not provide sufficient information about the type of the bug and its location.
For example, assuming the same bug as in Example 2, the backward rewriting would
produce Rem1 = a0 b0 a1 b1 + a1 b1 , with no indication as to the source of the bug.
Furthermore, a single bug can make the size of remainder very large, making the
analysis of the source of the bug difficult and the debugging process very hard. In
contrast, in forward reduction, the remainder contains the signal name of the faulty
gate and the location of the bug does not affect the size of the remainder.

6.3

Multiple Bugs Analysis

The debugging method using forward reduction described in the previous section
can be extended to multiple bugs. In general, arithmetic bugs can be divided into
independent bugs and dependent bugs. Independent bugs are those that will not
affect each other; typically they appear in different cones. Since each cone is verified
separately, each independent bug can be treated as a single bug in its own cone.
Dependent bugs can be classified into four cases, shown in Figure 6.4. The blank
circle in the figure represents the correct gate. The shaded circle represents a false
gate, i.e., the gate that was erroneously replaced by another gate. It can be of any type
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Figure 6.4: Different cases for dependent bugs.
discussed in Table 6.1, and even extended to other gates. Assume that in a correct
implementation the gate e1 is an AND gate and the remaining gates are XOR. With
this, the specification of the cone with output z is Spec = d1 d2 + e2 + e3 + e4 + z.
The remainder in the case of multiple bugs depends not only on the cases shown
in Figure 6.4, but also on the type of the bugs, listed in Table 6.1 (c.f. Section 6.2).
Recall that intermediate input variables appear exactly once in each fanout-free cone.
For this reason, the remainder for the circuit with bugs of type 2, 4, 5, 6 of Table
I (i.e., those that have only false inputs left in the remainder) will be composed of
disjoint sets of complete input pairs. As a result, the bugs of these types will not
affect each other, regardless how they are connected (c.f. Case 1, 2, 3, 4 in Figure
6.4). One just needs to identify the complete input pairs in the remainder to detect
the bugs. On the other hand, as mentioned in Section 6.2, for bug types 1 and 3 of
Table I, both the input signals and the output signal of the false gate will appear in
the Remainder. For this reason, when multiple bugs appear together, they will affect
each other.
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Example 3: Consider Case 1 in Figure 6.4, where the bugs at e1 and f2 are
not connected directly. Assume that the AND gate e1 is replaced by an XOR, and
the XOR gate f2 is replaced by an AND. The remainder computed by Algorithm 4,
Rem = d1 d2 + e1 + e3 + e4 + f2 can be partitioned into two disjoint groups, based
on the input and output variables, such that each group forms a complete inputoutput pair: (d1 d2 + e1 ) and (e3 + e4 + f2 ). In this case, it is always possible to
achieve such a partition, since the two bugs are not connected directly. Specifically,
the analysis of the non-zero base tells us that d1 , d2 , e3 , e4 are the input signals (the
head monomials), and e1 , f2 are output signal (the tail monomials). Therefore, both
bugs can be detected, one for e1 gate and the other for f2 gate.
Analysis of the other cases, where the false signals interact with each other, is
more complex, as illustrated by the following example.
Example 4: Consider Case 2 in Figure 6.4, when the XOR gates f1 and z are
replaced by the AND gates. Here we cannot find a complete input-output pair in
Remainder = e1 + e2 + f2 + z, because signal f1 is not only the false output of gate
f1 but also the false input of gate z. In this case we need to search for incomplete
pairs in order to properly identify the bugs. For Cases 3 and 4, with the same
Remainder = e1 + e2 + e3 + e4 + z, the input-output pairs cannot be found. The
result depends on how z can be expressed as a combination of f1 , f2 that partitions
the remainder into groups. The detailed discussion of these cases is beyond the scope
of this thesis proposal.

6.4

Results and Conclusions

The debugging technique described in this paper was implemented in Python
and interfaced with the computer algebra tool, Singular [29], to affect the polynomial
reduction. The experiments were performed on an Intel Core CPU i5-3470 @ 3.20 GHz
4 with 15.6 GB memory, using Mastrovito multipliers up to 256 bits as benchmarks

[76]. The more complex and challenging Montgomery multipliers [42] have only been
partially tested and not reported here.
Table 6.2: Results of Mastrovito multipliers with single bug per cone.
Largest cone
Operand size

# polys

z5 , 16-bit
z21 , 64-bit
z63 ,128-bit
z10 ,256-bit

167
539
1167
2033

Runtime for Avg. runtime Max runtime
bug-free
for buggy
for buggy
cone (sec)
cone (sec)
cone (sec)
0.36
0.36
0.37
6.2
6.3
6.3
19.3
19.4
19.5
46.3
46.5
46.6

Table 6.2 shows the verification results for a single bug inserted randomly in the
circuit and illustrates the fact that the location of the bug does not affect the verification performance. To ensure that the location of the bug is the only variable
factor in this experiment, for each circuit we extracted the largest output logic cone
and inserted a single bug in it. The experiment was repeated for each cone 20 times,
each time randomly changing the location of the bug, so they can be anywhere in
the circuit and of any type shown in Table 6.1. The average time of the experiments
was computed and the worst case runtime it took to locate the bug recorded. As we
can see in the Table, the longest and average times are similar, which means that the
time to locate and correct the bug does not depend on its location in the circuit. Furthermore, the time to verify the bug-free circuit is almost the same as the debugging
of a single bug. In other approaches, the difference between these two times can be
significant [46] [74].
Table 6.3 shows the debugging results for Mastrovito multipliers with multiple bugs.
It gives the time it takes to verify the bug-free circuit, makes comparison with [62],
and shows the number of bugs and the time to debug multiple bugs. The data of
Table 6.3, in conjunction with that in Table 6.2, shows that the runtime for verifying
the entire circuit is much less than the runtime of verifying a single cone multiplied
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Table 6.3: Results of Mastrovito multipliers with multiple bugs.
Operand
size
8
16
32
64
128
163
256

Runtime for
Avg. runtime for
Number
bug-free
multiple bugs
Result of [62]
of bugs
circuit (sec)
circuit (sec)
0.33
0.09
16
0.37
0.84
0.42
24
0.92
3.89
0.83
32
4.23
30.39
28.90
40
31.30
283.72
924.3
48
286.94
667.38
3,546.0
56
676.07
2,111.43
6,728.0
64
2,135.92

by the number of cones. This is because the verification of each cone is performed in
parallel since the cones are independent from each other.
Column 3 of Table 6.3 shows the performance of [62] that used backward reduction
with the BO > order and Gröebner basis. As we can see, our results are superior for
circuit sizes above 64 bits. This suggests that F O > order can be a better choice for
GF verification. The major advantage of the F O > order, however, is the performance
of debugging, as shown in columns 2 and 5 of Table 6.3. We randomly inserted bugs
(dependent or independent) in circuit. The runtime difference between the bug-free
circuit and a buggy circuit is negligible. Even in the largest case of the 256-bit
Mastrovito multiplier, with 64 bugs inserted, the runtime difference is insignificant.
In summary, our verification scheme based on forward reduction scheme offers
an effective method for identifying and removing bugs in GF circuits. Unlike other
methods, its performance does not depend on the location of the bug, and the time
to locate the bug is comparable to verifying a bug-free circuit.
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CHAPTER 7
CONTRIBUTIONS, PUBLICATIONS

Symbolic computer algebra approach is believed to be the most successful verification technique for arithmetic circuits verification [25].

Two flavors of these

techniques dominate the field: one, based on Gröbner basis polynomial reduction
[69][82][59][46][68][66] [65]; and the other, based on algebraic rewriting [21][86], described in this thesis.
Specifically, this work includes the following novel contributions:
• Formally analyzed the relation between algebraic rewriting and division-based
GB reduction techniques, coming to a reasonable conclusion that the algebraic
rewriting is more efficient from the implementation point of view.
• Contributed to the development of the bit-flow model, which provides an argument for soundness and completeness of the algebraic rewriting method, independently from the computer algebra arguments.
• Developed an efficient approach to the verification of truncated multipliers. To
the best of our knowledge, it is the first successful approach to formally verify
such circuits. The framework using re-synthesis technique can be applied to
other truncated arithmetic circuits and other circuit verification problem.
• Proposed an efficient debugging method for Galois Field multipliers. To the best
of our knowledge, it is the first computer algebra based debugging technique
whose performance is not significantly affected by the bug location. In addition,
this method does not suffer from memory overload problem.
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• The forward variable order ”F O >”, proposed for the debugging method, enables performing verification and debugging at the same time. It also allows
forward rewriting of GF circuits.
• Proposed a case-splitting method to efficiently verify arithmetic circuits subjected to arithmetic constraints. The concept of vanishing monomials is introduced to analyze the problem of arithmetic constraints.
Publications Related to this Work
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• Atif Yasin, Tiankai Su, Sébastien Pillement, Maciej Ciesielski, ”Functional
Verification of Hardware Dividersusing Algebraic Model”, IEEE international
conference on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) and System-on-Chip (SoC)
design (VLSI-SOC), Oct. 2019.
• Maciej Ciesielski, Tiankai Su, Atif Yasin, Cunxi Yu, ”Understanding Algebraic
Rewriting for Arithmetic Circuit Verification: a Bit-Flow Model” , IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems (TCAD
2019), April 2019.
• Atif Yasin, Tiankai Su, Sbastien Pillement, Maciej Ciesielski, ”Formal Verification of Integer Dividers: Division by a Constant”, IEEE Computer Society
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Verifying Non-linear Arithmetic Circuits”, ACM/IEEE Asia and South Pacific
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